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PREFACE
The two major purposes of this paper are, to show the role which 
the United Nations has played in assisting Indonesia and Algeria to 
achieve their independence; and to draw from the United Nations' 
experience with the Indonesian and the Algerian questions conclusions 
which are pertinent to assessing the general role which the United 
Nations can play in helping to resolve international disputes stemming 
from colonial (or allegedly colonial) issues.
Indonesia was a colony of the Netherlands for three and a half 
centuries. As in many other areas in Asia and Africa, the nationalist 
movement grew gradually in Indonesia from early in the Twentieth Century. 
On 17 August 19^5 (two days after the surrender of the Japanese to the 
Allied Powers) a group of nationalist leaders in Java declared 
Indonesian independence and proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia.
Dr. Achmed Soekarno was named President of that Republic, and 
Dr. Mohammed Hatta was named the Vice-President. The Netherlands 
opposed the new Republic from its inception, using economic sanctions 
and military action making it necessary for the United Nations to 
intervene.
The United Nations dealt promptly with the Indonesian question when 
it was brought to it on 3I July 19^7. It adopted a series of resolutions 
whenever it deemed it necessary to support the cessation of hostilities 
and to induce the disputants to reach an agreement by peaceful means.
The United Nations also tendered its mediation through a Committee of
1
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Good Offices which acted as its representative. This Committee greatly 
assisted the parties to come to a truce agreement called the Renville 
Agreement, in vdiich the parties agreed to a cease fire, and upon 
political principles that formed a basis for further political dis­
cussing.
Shortly after the signing of the agreement, the relations between 
the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic deteriorated rapidly and 
culminated in renewed fighting. The United Nations acted promptly to 
restore the peace. It converted the Committee of Good Offices into the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and gave it greater 
authority than its predecessor. The United Nations adopted several 
resolutions to ensure an effective cease-fire and the release of 
Indonesian political leaders (including the President and the Vice- 
President of the Republic) who were held by the Dutch. The United 
Nations Commission played an invaluable role in bringing the parties to 
a settlement agreed to at the Round-Table Conference, held at the Hague 
in December 1949. The sovereignty of the Netherlands over Indonesia 
was transferred in that same month to the United States of Indonesia.
Unlike Indonesia, which was a Dutch colony, Algeria is considered 
by France and many Western Powers (including the United States and 
Great Britain) as an integral part of France. The extensive European 
settlement in Algeria, and the political role of the French Army, 
further complicate the Algerian problem.
The Algerian uprising for independence, like the Indonesian 
revolution, was greatly inspired by the rising tide of nationalism in 
Asia and Africa. The uprising began on 1 November 1954, and still is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in progress. The French '3overnraent, until recently, has considered the 
uprising to be led by minority groups backed by communists and has 
refused to negotiate xd-th the revolutionaries.
On 29 July 1955» before the tenth session of the General Assembly, 
fourteen Afro-Asian states expressed their concern over the revolution 
in Algeria and requested the Assembly to place the item on its agenda. 
The item was included on the agenda of each session of the General 
Assembly since then. During the five successive sessions in xfhich the 
General Assembly considered the Algerian question, no resolution of real 
importance passed. The General Assembly adopted only two resolutions.
In each it simply expressed its hope for a peaceful and democratic 
solution to the problem. Despite the efforts of the Afro-Asian and the 
Soviet blocs, the United Nations refused several times to recognize the 
right of the Algerians to self-determination or independence. It also 
refused to request the parties to cease hostilities and to resort to 
peaceful means in solving their dispute.
On 13 June 1956, thirteen states from Africa and Asia requested 
the Security Council to discuss the Algerian question. The Security 
Council refused to include the item on its agenda because the Algerian 
revolution was considered a matter exclusively within the domestic 
jurisdiction of France. Since then the question has not been placed on 
the agenda of the Security Council, except in an indirect way when the 
Security Council discussed Tunisian interference in the Algerian 
Question, as xfill be discussed in Chapter eight.
While the United Nations played an invaluable role in settling the 
Indonesian conflict, it has failed thus far to play a similar role in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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its attempt to ameliorate the Algerian dispute. Why did the United 
Nations succeed in finding a settlement for the Indonesian question and 
not for the Algerian problem? What factors helped the United Nations 
to play a vital role in solving the Indonesian question? What factors 
hampered United Nations action on the Algerian problem? To what extent 
did domestic issues inside the Netherlands and France affect the United 
Nations' action? Where did the major powers stand in both cases, and 
what was the significance of their position? How was the World 
divided with regard to these two colonial issues? Finally, -vdiat con­
clusions derived from these two disputes have meaning for the future?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PART ONE
THE INDONESIAN QUESTION 
A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND
It is very hard to name a precise or even rough date for the
beginning of the Indonesian nationalist movement. The movement became
organized early in the second decade of the twentieth century, but mar%r
of its most important elements go back much further. One of the most
important factors which delayed its appearance was lack of leadership.
When the Indonesian Nationalists leaders did emerge they found ready
1support from the peasantry.
Actually, the Dutch themselves were responsible for producing,
although unconsciously, the nationalist Indonesian elite. When the
Dutch occupied the Indies about three and half centuries ago, the Pan
Islamic movement presented a threat to their rule. Those who believed
in Pan Islamism preached the doctrine of loyalty to the Ottoman Caliph
as the head of the most powerful Moslem state and the authority most
fitted to direct and co-ordinate the political forces of the Moslem
peoples. The Dutch chose to fight this problem with Western education,
in order to turn the Indonesian minds from Pan Islamim toward cultural
association with the Dutch. But this weapon had a second edge, which
started cutting the opposite way. Those who obtained western education
2became the most powerful source of opposition to Dutch rule.
With the rise of nationalism the colonial power faced a serious
^George McTuman Çahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. 
(Ithaca,,New York’t :ComelliUnivergity Press% 19$2T,4].:,
^Ibid., 44.
6
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3dilemma— whatever it did or it did not do, it was its o>m grave digger.
In the field of education, for example, the Dutch had enacted discrimin­
atory measures against the Indonesians because there were not enough 
jobs for the educated people. These measures nurtured anti-Dutch 
sentiments. Those discriminated against and unable to receive an 
education turned to revolutionary nationalism. Those who had the 
opportunity to obtain an education learned more about democracy and 
freedom but jobs were verj limited. So they, too, were unsatisfied 
ifith their position and turned to revolutionary nationalism.
A. The Development of Indonesian Independence
The development of Indonesian independence can be divided into 
three periods. The first period, in vThich the Islamic Association and 
the Budi Utomo were the strongest organizations, started in I9O8 and 
ended around 1926. The main objectives of this movement were religious, 
cultural and educational in character. The movement did not present a 
common view toward nationalism. The second period covered the years 
from 1926 to 193^' During this period national political principles 
became stronger than the religious forces. The nationalists gathered 
their strength and began working mostly underground against the Dutch 
rule in Indonesia. Dr. Achmed Soekamo organized the Indonesian National 
Party. This party was disbanded when Dr. Soekamo was arrested by the 
Dutch in 1931.^
3Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, (Nevf York: Harper & 
Brothers), 1959. 53-
4"Facts on Indonesia: Somprehensive View of the Indonesian 
Struggle," United Asia, I, (January-February,1949), 380.
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The nationalist leaders of Indonesia used different policies during 
the third period which started in 1934, The nationalists decided that 
their policy during the second period was wrong and that they should 
co-operate with the Dutch, and get their independence through negotia­
tions rather than by working underground against Netherland rule. They 
asked the Dutch for a ten year transition period, after which they would 
have a freely elected autonomous government within the Netherlands
5Ehpire. The Dutch did not agree and jailed the potential leaders.
They distrusted the nationalist leaders and were afraid of a communist 
threat if incapable leaders took the rule in that area. The Dutch felt 
responsible for keeping peace and order in that area.
B. The Japanese Occupation
World War II brought Japanese invasion and occupation of Indonesia 
which lasted three and one-half years. The Japanese occupation, and the 
continuous refusal on the part of the Dutch to give hope for national 
independence, became important factors in uniting the Indonesian people. 
The Indonesian nationalists, in order to get their independence, divided 
their movement into two organizations. One was legal and co-operated 
ifith the Japanese administration, the other, linked to the first, worked 
underground against the Japanese occupation and the Dutch rule.^
The Japanese gave the Indonesians a political and economic power 
which they never enjoyed under Dutch rule. The Indonesians received 
arms, military training, nationalistic encourgement from the Japanese
381.
Ibid.
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and were fed anti-western propaganda,*̂  ^etan Sjahrir, the Repuolican
premier, stated that during the Japanese rule;
A nê T realization was born, in our people, a national feeling 
that,was sharper than ever before. This feeling ... was also 
sharpened by the Japanese propaganda for Pan-Asian!sm. Later 
attempts by the Japanese to suppress the nationalistic movement 
were to no avail. During three and a half years of occupation 
the whole state organization ... which had been controlled by 
the Dutch, was handled by the Indonesians under the authority 
of Japanese ... Our nation acquired greater confidence, and 
our national awareness^grew toward.s the Japanese as well as 
towards other nations.
The end of the Japanese occupation left the Indonesians better prepared
than ever before in military and administrative skills. The way was
paved for revolution,
C. The Proclamation of the Indonesian Republic
On 17 August 194,5, two days after the Japanese surrender, most of 
the nationalist leaders in Indonesia assembled at Batavia and declared 
Indonesian independence. It took the Allied troops about six weeks 
after the Japanese surrender to arrive at Java and Batavia. During this
period the Republican Government claimed jurisdiction over most of Java,
9Madura, and Sumatra.
Host of the Allied troops sent to Indonesia were British and Indian. 
These troops, deployed by the Supreme Allied Commander for South East 
Asia, had two main tasks ; to disarm all Japanese Armed personnel and
'Rupert Emerson, "Reflections on the Indonesian Case," World 
Politics, I, (October 1948), 60.
Q
United Nations Peaceful Settlement in Indonesia (New York; United 
Nations Secretariat, Department of Public Information). 1951, 40.
q J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," Inter­
national Conciliation, No,459 (March, 1950), 115»
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and take them into custody, and to rescue prisoners of war and internees.
The Allied officials found it necessary to establish relations with the
Indonesian leaders in order to achieve their task. They accorded de
facto recognition to the Republic of Indonesia. The Allied officials
recognized the ^  jure sovereignty of the Netherlands and helped the
10return of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
There was no trouble when the Allied troops first landed in Java, 
but when the Dutch troops arrived many clashes took place between the 
Republic and the Dutch troops. The British troops interfered to restore 
order and became involved in the fights on a larger scale. On 7 Septem­
ber 1946, the British declared that their troops would be withdrawn the 
follovring 30 November. The world did not pay very much attention to 
what was happening in Indonesia, with the exception of the Ukrainian 
SSR and the Soviet Union who brought the question to the attention of 
the United Nations Security Council on 21 January 1946. By bringing the 
question to the Security Council the Soviet bloc might have wanted to 
shift attention from the Iranian dispute, to which the Soviet Union was 
a party. However, the Indonesian question was not included in the agenda 
of the Security Council because it was deemed a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands and because it was not regarded as a 
threat to the international peace and security.
D. The Linggadjati Agreement and Its Aftermath
Many political and military distrubances broke out at the beginning 
of 1946 between the Republic and the Netherlands. The two parties
^^United Nations Peaceful Settlement in Indonesia (New York :
United Nations Secretariat, Department of Public Information), 1951. 40.
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realized that negotiations at that stage were very essential. The
British Government offered its mediation to assist the parties to reach
a peaceful settlement. The offer was welcomed by the two parties, and
a long and complex series of negotiations took place. Out of these
, 11negotiations the Linggadjati Agreement was signed on 25 March 1947.
Four major points were provided in the Linggadjati Agreement; 1. The 
Netherlands Government should recognize the Republic Government as the 
de facto authority in Java and Sumatra. 2. Each should co-operate with 
the other in establishing the United States of Indonesia by January 
1949. 3. The two parties should assist each other in the formation of
a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, also by January 1949. 4. The Dutch
12troops should leave the ^  facto Republican areas as soon as possible. 
After the signing of the Agreement, the situation in Indonesia 
continued to move from bad to worse. The Dutch maintained restrictions 
on trade with the Republic and disapproved of Republican attempts to 
establish diplomatic relations with Egypt, India, Iraq, and Lebanon.
The Republic complained that the Dutch had established separate states 
of Borneo and East Indonesia in violation of the Linggadjati Agreement 
and were supporting a separatist movement in West Java.
Since the Agreement was phrased in broad and general terms, dif­
ferent interpretations were attached by each side to the original 
agreement. Mutual suspicions, distrust and misunderstanding made the 
implementation of the agreement impossible. The negotiations between
Emerson, Loo.,cit., 64-6?.
^^Charlès.Wolf, Jr., "Background of the Indonesian Crisis," United 
Nations World, I, (September 194?). 14-1 j).
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the parties formally ended the latter part of June, 19^7. Each party 
accused the other of aggression and violation of the truce agreement. 
Finally, on 20 July 19^7 the Dutch undertook what they called a "police 
action" against the Republic.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II 
THE Ul'IITED NATIONS INTERVENE
A. The Security Council Resolution of 1 Aagust 194? .̂id the Attitude of 
the Members of the Security Council Toward the Question
Soon after the outbreak of the military operations in Indonesia, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and India tried to 
induce the parties to cease fighting and to solve their problems through 
peaceful means, but they did not succeed.
Tv70 letters, dated 30 July 19̂ 7, brought the situation in Indonesia 
to the Security Council's attention. On the very next day the 
Security Council discussed and placed the question on its agenda. The 
first letter was from the Australian representative on the Security 
Council to the Secretary-General. It drew the attention of the Security 
Council to the hostilities which were in progress in Java and Sumatra 
between armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. 
These hostilities, the letter suggested, constituted a breach of peace 
under Article 39 of the United Nations' Charter?"^ On the next day the 
Australian representative asked the Security Council to take quick 
action to restore international peace and security. He regarded the 
Iiostilities as warfare between two states and not,, as the Netherlands
"̂ Ar-ticle 39 of the Charter states that "the Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. "
13
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14claimed, a police action,
Australia submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council in 
which she would have the Security Council propose the following;
The Security Council.
Having determined that such hostilities constitute a breach of 
peace under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Call upon the_Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic 
of the Indonesia, under Article 40 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to comply with the following measures, such measures 
to be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of 
either party:
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration in accordance with 
Article XVII of the Linggardjati Agreement, signed at Batavia 
on 25 March 194?. ̂ 5
The second letter was sent by the Government of India, The repre­
sentative of India brought the Indonesian question to the Security 
Council under the first paragraph of Article 35 in Chapter VI of the 
Charter of the United Nations which provides that any member of the 
United Nations may bring any situation or any dispute which might lead 
to international friction to the attention of the Security Council or 
to the General Assembly, He declared that "fighting on a large scale 
is continuing in Indonesia ,,, /an^ my Government’s most immediate 
concern is to put an end to this warfare.
In justifying her "police action," the Netherlands claimed that 
what the Indonesians called military action was backed by all the
14United Nations, Official Records of the Sècurit:v Council. Second 
Year, 171st Meeting, (31 July 1947) 1^22-1623- Hereafter cited as
O.R.S.C with appropriate year, meeting and page citation following.
^^Ibid 1626. 
^^Ibid 1620.
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political parties and the trade unions, except the communists, in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, the representative continued, the action was
taken mth full understanding and approval of the other two States of
the Republic of Indonesia, that is, Eastern Indonesia and Borneo. He
added that the Linggadjati Agreement did not settle problems such as the
release of hostages, and the blockading by Indonesian nationalists of
territory held by the Dutch troops in Batavia, Semarang, and Soerabage.
At the end of May 19^7, the Dutch representative stated, there were ?00
white hostages and 10,000 other hostages still being held by the
Republic, and the food blackade of the areas held by the Dutch troops
17did not cease until police action was taken.
The Dutch representative characterized the Republican Army as 
irresponsible. The Japanese gave arms to the Republican Arm^ shortly 
before the Japanese surrendered in order to create troubles after their 
defeat. The people who received the arms formed lawless armed bands 
which terrorized and coerced the inhabitants. The Dutch troops were 
forced to take what was "police action," not warfare. Resorting to 
arbitration, he believed, would have led to more delay, more suffering 
and to the strengthening of the position of the Republic.
Finally, the Dutch representative concluded, the Security Council 
was not competent to deal ;-rLth the situation in Indonesia. He invoked
^'^Ibid., 1640. 
^^Ibid., 1640-1642.
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Article two (7),̂  ̂of the Charter of the United Nations and claimed that 
the question was ijlthln the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands 
Government. He opposed those who considered the situation in Indonesia 
to be a threat to international peace. He asked, "In what countries 
outside the Netherlands territory are there any signs of danger to 
peace caused by this action?"
In reply to the Dutch statement, Dr. Soetan Sjahrir, the represent­
ative of the Republic, denied the Dutch claims and e:{plained how the 
Dutch military attack of 20 July 194? came about. Dr. Sjahrir denied
that 700 hostages were being held by the Republic, and he added that
21there were no internees left within Republican territory.
Dr. Sjahrir stated that, although the Linggadjati Agreement was 
initialed by both parties on 1$ November 1946, in I4arch 1947 the Dutch 
Commission General returned from the Netherlands T-rith the agreement 
unsigned and asked the Republic to agree to a unilateral Dutch inter­
pretation of the agreement. The Republic refused to accept such an 
interpretation. Finally, after long negotiations and viith the under­
standing that the Dutch interpretation iras not to be binding on the
 ̂2Ronublic, the Linggadjati Agreement iras signed on 25 harch 1947.
■̂ 'Article two (?), of the Charter of the United Nations states, 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters î diich are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ..."
^^O.R.S.C,, Second, Year, 171st Meeting, (3I July 194?), 1647.
"Points from the Statement of Dr. Soetan Sjahrir," United 
Nations Weekly Bulletin III, (26 August 1947), 278.
^-Ibid.
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In the meantime, the Republican representative stated, the Dutch,
by large scale military action, violated the status quo and blockaded
all Indonesian ports. Despite this violation, the Republic, having the
sincere belief that the Dutch aggression would be brought to an end,
23signed the agreement.
In May 194?, the representative of the Republic declared, a new
crisis developed when the Dutch asked the Republic to accept a new
proposal based on the Dutch interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement.
After the Netherlands refused to negotiate, the Republic invoked Article
17 of the Linggadjati Agreement, which provided for arbitration. But
the Dutch disregarded the Republicans repeated requests for arbitration,
24the Republican representative added.
Although the Republic conceded to most of the Dutch demands,
Dr. Sjahrir stated, the Netherlands was not satisfied and further 
demands were made on 19 July. The Republic was asked to xd-thdraw its 
troops ten kilometers from their positions within tx<renty-four hours.
VJhen the Republic asked for another twenty-four hours to study the 
matter, the request xras rejected as a large scale military attack began 
on the night of 20 July 194-7.̂ -̂
Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, the representative of the United States, 
stated that the Council should take immediate action to stop the 
hostilities which might endanger international peace and security. 
Although the United States representative sympathized greatly xrith the
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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objectives of the Australian draft resolution, he offered an amendment
to the named draft resolution to avoid legal questions. He believed
that the invocation of Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, to which the
Australian resolution refered, "raises a very complex and serious
26question of law."
The United States amendment to the Australian draft resolution did 
not refer to any Article of the Charter of the United Nations, and did 
not judge the sovereignty of the Dutch over the Republic. The amend­
ment read as follows;
The Security Council.
Noting: T-ri-th concern the hostilities in progress between the armed 
forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia,
Calls upon the parties,
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith,
(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful 
means. '
The representative of the United States informed the Security
Council that his Government offered its good offices to assist the
28parties to reach a peaceful and just agreement. The Soviet Union
opposed this offer strongly because she considered it as "an effort to 
by-pass the United N a t i o n s . T h e  Netherlands welcomed the offer 
unconditionally.
The Republic of Indonesia, although she accepted the offer
'̂:̂O.R.S.C., Second Year, l?2nd Meeting, (1 August 194?), 1637.
Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia " Inter­
national Conciliation, No.459 (March 1950), 194.
^^O.R.S.C., Second, Year, l?2nd Meeting, (1 August 194?), I658.
^^Collins, Loc, cit., I3I.
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gratefully at first,later qualified her position and e]q)lained her
distrust of direct negotiation vjith the Netherlands. The representative
of the Republic stated that the United States' offer of good offices
could bear fruit only if it were a continuation of an action already
31taken by the Security Council. Finally, on 22 August, the United
States' representative informed the Council that the Republic of
Indonesia rejected her offer of good offices.
The Soviet Union regarded the Netherlands action in Indonesia as a
breach of the peace. The representative of the Soviet Union asked the
Security Council to take the necessary actions which would end the
Dutch aggression and restore peace and security. He warned the Security
Council against shifting its attention from the basic issue of the war,
331-ihich was in progress, to its legal aspect.The Soviet representative 
attacked the position which was taken by the representative of the 
Netherlands. He insisted that Indonesia was an independent state, that 
the situation in Indonesia did threaten the international peace and 
security, and that the United Nations was competent to deal with such a 
question.^
The representative of the Soviet Union concluded his speech by 
adding to the Australian resolution an amendment in xrhich the Security 
Council would ask that the troops of both parties should be xrithdraim
^%.R.S.C., Second Year, 184th Meeting, (l-'l- August 194-7), 2003. 
^^O.R.3.C., Second Tear, 187th Meeting, (19 Au:,ust Igdy), 2079.
-̂“Collins, Loc. cit., 132.
"^O.R.S.C.. Second Year, l?2nd Meeting, (1 Augusu 194-7), 16:0-1 
loid., 1661-1664-.
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immediately to the positions they occupied before the military action 
began. This amendment did not receive the necessary votes for p assage.35 
The voting pattern was two in favor, Poland and the Soviet Union, and 
nine abstentions.
The representatives of France and Belgium questioned the competence 
of the Security Council to deal imth the Indonesian question. The 
representative of the United Kingdom regarded the situation in Indonesia 
as a possible danger to international peace and tranquility. Hoxjever, 
he did not consider the hostilities as a war between two sovereign 
states. He believed that Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter would be 
applicable to this situation rather than Article 39 of the Charter, 
because he viewed the situation, "not as a dispute between the Nether­
lands and the Indonesian Republic, but ... the fighting in progress
/which migh;^ well create a situation leading to international 
friction." The British representative wanted the Security Council to 
take note of the offer of mediation of the United States and xfait for 
future developments rather than follow the lines of the Australian 
proposal.
Acting promptly and efficiently, the Security Council adopted the 
Australian resolution as it was amended by the United States and Poland 
on the second day of its submission. The Polish araendiaent asked the 
oarties to keep the Security Council informed about the development of
33q.r. s.C. Second Year, 173rd Meeting, (1 August 194?), I710. 
O.R.S.C., Second. Year,-172nd Meeting, (1 August 1941), I656-
1657.
^^Ibid.
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the settlement, Tlie resolution of 1 August 19^7,passed only two days 
after the Security Council was informed about the situation in Indonesia, 
read as follows:
The Security Council,
I'lotinfT with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed 
forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia,
Calls upon the parties,
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) To settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful 
means and keep thegSecurity Council informed about the progress 
of the settlement.
B The Committee of Good Officies
Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the President of
the Security Council cabled it to the two parties concerned. Two days
later the Netherlands Government accepted the resolution, though it
persisted in the denial of the Council's jurisdiction in the matter,
and "instructed the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands
Indies to enter into contact iri.th the authorities of the Republic in
order to arrive at the cessation on both sides of hostile action of any 
"39kind. On 6 August, the Indonesian Republic informed the Council that 
it had ordered all Republican armed forces to cease hostilities.
Tlie situation remained unstable even after the cease-fire order had 
been issued. Shortly after the acceptance of the resolution by the 
belligerents, several representatives in the Security Council, noted 
that the Dutch and the Indonesians maintained that the other had 
violated the resolution and started hostilities again. The Security 
Council's first problem at this stave :ras to ensure the effcctivness of
'̂'Yearbook of the United Nations, (Lake Success, New' York; U.N. 
Department of Public Information), (19^7-19^3), ,
3?0.R,S.C., Second Year, 174th Meeting, (4 August 1947), 1716-171?
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the resolution of 1 August 19^7. The second problem was to assist the 
parties to reach lasting settlement.
On 25 August 1947 the Security Council, in a resolution proposed 
by the Polish representative and backed by all the members of the 
Security Council with the exception of the United Kingdom, reminded the 
parties of its resolution of 1 August 19^7, and asked them "to adhere 
strictly to the recommendations of the Security Council of 1 Au;.:eist
1947."
Furthermore, the Security Council in a joint Chinese-Australian 
resolution asked the governments represented on the Security Council to 
have their career consular officers in Batavia report to the Security 
Council jointly on the manner in which the cease fire resolution was 
being observed. This Commission was to have no power except to report 
to the Council, The Security Council also adopted a resolution, i>jhich 
was proposed by the United States* representative, in which it expressed 
"its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement 
through a Committee of the Council consisting of three members of the 
Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by 
the two so selected.
On 4 September 1947, the Security Council was notified by the 
representative of the Netherlands that his Government chose Belgium to 
represent it on the Committee of Good Offices. On 18 September 1947, 
the Republic of Indonesia informed the Council that she had selected
hoYearbook of the United Nations, (1947-1948),- 569. 
^^See Appendix A, The Second Resolution,
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Australia as her representative on that Committee. On the same day the
42United States was chosen by Belgium and Australia.
On 24 September 194?, the Consular Commission submitted an interim 
report to the Secretary General. According to that report, the cease­
fire order was not fully effective. The two parties interpreted the 
cease-fire resolution differently; and it was impossible, the report
added, to observe the cease-fire order completely if the situation
43continued in that manner. Moreover, the Committee of Good Offices 
faced greater difficulties in assisting the parties to solve political 
questions than it did in observing the cease-fire order. The Committee 
had to be very cautious in taking any step which might be considered by 
the Dutch as an interference in matters which lay within the Netherlands 
domestic jurisdiction.̂
It soon became clear to the Committee, when it arrived at Batavia 
on 27 October 194?* that the Netherlands and -üie Republic of Indonesia 
had different views of the task of that Committee. To the Republic, the 
Committee was to take an active part in the negotiations and to find a 
solution of the problem of Indonesian independence. The Netherlands, on 
the other hand, expected the Committee to give suggestions only on 
questions of procedures. The Committee decided to limit itself to 
making suggestions which would assist the parties to settle their
^^Yearbook of the United Nations, (1947̂ .948)., 378.
^3o .r .s,c . , Second. Year» 207th Meetohg, (3 Octdbeï: 1947 ),' 2486.
lih,Collins, lio'c. Cit.., I3I.
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dispute only "if and when the Committee was requested to do so by the 
parties."
But when the Security Council adopted a resolution on 1 November
1947, requesting the Committee to "assist the parties in reaching
agreement on an arrangement which /[woul^ ensure the observance of the
46cease-fire resolution, the Committee considered itself "directed to 
offer its assistance to the parties ... without awaiting a request by
47either party."
■̂̂ O.R.S.C., Third Year, Special Supplaiient No.l, First Intern 
Report of the Coimiittee to the Security Council, (10 February 1943), 2.
^International Organization : "Suimaary of Activities of the United 
Nations Security Council, The Indonesian Question," International 
Organization, II, .(1948), .85. .
"̂̂ O.R. S.C,, Third Year, Special Supplement Nos.1-2, First Interim 
Report of the Committee to the Security Council, (10 February 1948), 3-
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CHAPTER III
THE RENVILLE TRUCE AGREEMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH
After long and complex negotiations under the guidance of the
Committee of Good Officies, the two parties signed a truce agreement on
48the U5S Renville, on 1? January 1948. The truce agreement consisted 
of twelve political principles forming an agreed basis for further 
political discussions. Four of these principles were taken from the 
Linggadjati Agreement, and the other eight were proposed by the Nether­
lands delegation. The major points which composed the truce agreement 
were provisions;
...for gradual reduction of armed forces; for resumption of 
trade, transport and communication; ... for self-determination 
by the people of their political relations to the United States 
of Indonesia; for possible observation by a United Nations 
agency of condition between the signing of the agreement and 
the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.
The Committee of good Offices proposed six additional points, which 
were accepted by the parties on 19 January 1948. The six points 
provided, among other things, for Dutch sovereignty over the Netherlands 
Indies until, "after stated interval," the sovereignty was transferred 
to an independent United States of Indonesia, of which the Republic was 
to be a constituent state. Another important point was "that plebis­
cites be held under international observation to determine whether the 
peoples of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wished
48Ibid., Appendix XI, 72.
^^Yearbook of the United Nations. (1947-1948), 376-377.
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their respective territories to form part of the Republic of Indonesia
50or another state.”
The Republic had faith in the United Nations, a fact which made the 
truce possible. The Indonesian Republic even agreed, in the Renville 
Agreement, to permit the Netherlands to keep territories which were 
taken, in part, after the Dutch attack of 20 July 194-7.
The Security Council noted with satisfaction the achievements of 
the Committee of Good Offices, after it discussed the first interim 
report of that Committee in February 1949. The representative of the 
Republic of Indonesia declared that, although the results of the 
agreement were not in all respects satisfactory to the Republic, they 
accomplished the first significant success in the history of the United
51Nations.
The representatives of Belgium, the United States, The United 
Kingdom, China, and Australia were generally satisfied with the 
accomplishments of the Committee. The representatives of the Soviet 
Union and of the Ukraine were not. They believed that the Committee 
had put pressure on the Republic to sign the Renville Agreement and 
declared that the agreement betrayed the Indonesian people and insured
52the continuance of the colonial regime.
Shortly after the signing of the Renville Agreement, as in the 
months which followed the Linggadjati Agreement, the situation deteri­
orated quickly and culminated in renewed fighting. As the Committe«= of
^^roid., Appendix VIII, 67-63.
'^Yearbook of the United Nations, (1947-1943 ), 377 •
^^O.R.S.C., Tliird Year, 248th, 249th and 251st Meetings, (February
1948)
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Good Offices reported to the Security Council, the "major issues
dividing the parties /were/ the very issues which have always divided
53them and which the Linggadjati Agreement failed to resolve." The 
Republic of Indonesia wanted to keep its ^  facto authority, including 
its array and foreign relations, until sovereignty was transferred from 
the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia: but the Netherlands 
did not want the Republic to maintain such authority. The relationship 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands after the transfer of the 
sovereignty was another basic disagreement between the parties. The 
Republic wanted a completely independent United States of Indonesia 
tied only losely to the Netherlands, but the Dutch desired a "tight" 
Union with the Dutch Government. And so each party continued to work 
unilaterally toward its immediate goals.^
The representative of the Republic declared that the great distrust 
and suspicion on the part of the Indonesian Republic were caused by 
recent Netherlands actions: 1. The establishment of the so called 
Provisional Federal Government for Indonesia on 9 March 1948 by the 
Netherlands Government; 2. The Banding Conference of the non-Republican 
states of Indonesia, sponsored by the Dutch to discuss matters being 
negotiated with the Committee of Good Offices; 3- The Dutch Constitution 
was amended; (this amendment was with regard to the Netherlands- 
Indonesia Union; it was important to note that the amendment, the 
Republican representative continued, was binding on the Dutch
53united Nations, Security Council. Microprint Edition, Doc. S/848, 
(21 June 1948).
3^Collins, Loc. cit., 1954.
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delegations, and this fact made compromise impossible) 4. The attempt by 
the Netherlands Government to create states out of West Java, Madura and 
East Sumatra "without the plebiscite called for in the agreements ;
5. The severe economic blockade of the Republic.
The representative of tne Netherlands in a reply to the Indonesian 
claims stated that the main handicap to full agreement was the negative 
attitude taken by the Republic toward previous agreements, toward a 
federal Indonesian state and toward the Netherlands-USI Union. The 
Republic, he continued, was still affect by the old dream of having a 
unitary state which the Republicans would rule. The representative 
of Indonesia denied the intention of having a Unitarian state. Indo­
nesia favored a federation, not a federation such as the Netherlands
was trying to create, but one which was in the interest of the Dutch
57and not of the Indonesia people.
The Security Council studied the situation in Indonesia very 
carefully. The majority of the members of the Security Council were in 
favor of the Indonesian position. The situation was moving from bad to 
worse rapidly. Each party accused the other of violations of the 
Renville Truce Agreement. Distrust and suspicion increased. The Dutch 
economic blockade caused severe shortages in important commodities, 
especially medical supplies, clothes, and in some cases even food.'̂ ®
^^Yearbook of the United Nations, (1947-19^), 379.
^^O.R.S.C., Third Year, 3l6th Meeting, (10 June 1948), 26-27.
"̂̂ O.R.S.C.. Third Year, 326th Meeting, (23 June 1948), 4.
5^0.R.S.C,, Third Year, Supplement for July 1948, Doc., s/919.
(24 July 1948), 90.
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59The political negotiations came close to a standstill.
The representative of the Ukraine declared that the Committee of 
Good Offices was powerless to undertake any step to improve the 
situation. He blamed the United States and other western powers for 
the powerlessness of the Committee of Good Offices, Other representa­
tives believed that interference in the Committee's work would create 
handicaps in the progress of negotiation.
Finally, the Security Council adopted the follomng resolution, on 
29 July 1948:
The Security Council.
Calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic 
of Indonesia with the assistance of the Council's Committee of 
Good Offices, to maintain strict observance of both the military 
and economic articles of the Renville Truce Agreement, and to 
implement early and fully the Twelve Renville Political Principles 
and the Six Additional Principles.
^^Ibid.. Doc., S/916, (23 July 1948), 89.
60O.R.S.C., Third Year, 341st Meeting, (29 July 1948), 22.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SECOND MILITARY ACTION
In the Fourth Interim report of the Committee of Good Offices, 
dated I5 November 1948, the Security Council was informed that in spite 
of the Committee’s efforts to assist in solving the Indonesian dispute 
in accordance with the Renville Agreement there had been no progress 
since the previous June. The proposals which were made by the 
representatives of the IMited States and Australia to break the 
deadlock had been received reluctantly.by the Netherlands delegation.
This situation in the political negotiations, the report continued, led 
to economic setbacks within Indonesia as a whole, intensified political 
difficulties within the Republic, and increased tension between the 
parties. Consequently, the truce was endangered and the Committee 
doubted its ability to settle the dispute.
On 19 December 1948, military actions were resumed. The Committee
of Good Offices charged the Netherlands Government with violation of
62the Renville Truce Agreement. The Australian representative, in 
explaining the events which led to the second military action, stated 
that Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta, in a letter to the Dutch Government 
dated 12 December 1948, accepted many points which the Neterlands wanted. 
The reply to that letter from the Dutch Government, four days later, 
stipulated that the Republic should accept in advance all points still
^^Yearbook of the United- Nations. (1948-1949), 213. 
^^Ibid.
30
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under negotiations. Actually, that meant a complete surrender to the 
Netherlands Government. The Republic was given eighteen hours to make 
the decision. Because of the difficulties in communication, the United 
States representative, on the Committee of Good Offices,received notice 
of the new Dutch demand only one hour before the "zero” hour. The 
ultimatum was delivered to the Republican delegation only a quarter of 
an hour before the deadline for acceptance. All of the Committee’s 
documents were seized by the Dutch and the very people with whom they 
were negotiating were arrested immediately, including President 
Soekarno.^^
The representative of the Netherlands, in a long speech to the 
Security Council at its 388th meeting, charged the Republic of Indonesia 
with several violations of the Truce agreement. He declared that the 
Netherlands had to take what he called "police action" to restore law 
and order in that area and to stop certain Republicans from entering 
territory under Dutch control. The Netherlands policy in Indonesia, 
the Dutch representative stated," is and remains the promotion of the 
freedom of Indonesia in order to create a sovereign federation of 
Indonesia linked in voluntary and equal partnership with the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union." And what the Dutch 
wanted, the representative added, was to insure that no minority 
domination would disregard the democratic rights and privileges of the 
citizens and which would be under great influence from extremist 
parties.
^^O.R.S.C., Third Year, 390th Meeting, (23 December 19^8), 10-11. 
^^O.R.S.C., Third Year, 388th Meeting, (22 December 1948), 2-4.
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The representative of Indonesia made counter charges in the Security 
Council and claimed that the last Netherlands military action was but a 
continuation of Dutch policy. What the Dutch wanted, the Republican 
representative continued, was "to strangle us economically and politi­
cally and finish the job by a second military action which the Nether-
65lands launched four days ago."
The Council discussed the dispute at its 388th through 392nd 
meetings. The Soviet delegation proposed a draft resolution in which 
it asked, among other things, for: condemnation of the Netherlands 
aggression, immediate withdrawal of the Netherlands troops to their 
previous position and cessation of hostilities. This draft resolution 
was rejected by the Security Council. Syria and the Soviet Union voted 
in favor of the resolution; the remaining nine members of the Security 
Council (including the Ukraine)abstained.A new joint draft resolu­
tion sponsored by the United States, Sÿria, and Colombia was submitted 
and adopted on 24 December 1948.̂ "̂  The joint draft resolution read as 
follows :
The Security Council,
Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia, 
and,
Having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices, 
Calls upon the parties :
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) Immediately to release the President and other political 
prisoners arrested since 18 December;
Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security 
Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which 
have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948, and
65O.R.S.C., Third Year, 389th Meeting, (22 December 1948), 32. 
^^O.R.S.C., Third Year, 392nd Meeting, (24 December 1948), 39.
67.Ibid.. 38.
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to observe and report to the Security Council on the
compliance with s u b -paragraphs (a) and (b) above.
A few days after the adoption of this resolution, the Security 
Council received two reports from the Committee of Good Offices dated 
25 and 26 December. The two reports outlined the chief events since 12 
December and summarized the military operations since 19 December. The 
Committee also reported to the Security Council that the Netherlands 
did not comply with the resolution of the Security Council ifjhich was 
adopted on 24 December. After the Security Council discussed these 
reports, it deemed it necessary to repeat its demands in the resolution 
of 24 December 1948 to the parties. The Security Council repeated these
69demands in a resolution which was adopted on 28 December 1948.
All the members of the Security Council were dissatisfied with the 
Dutch response to the Council's resolutions, and they criticised 
strongly the Netherlands military attack. Belgium, Colombia, and Syria, 
having served their two year term in the Security Council, were replaced 
by Egypt, Norway, and Cuba, which joined in criticising the Dutch action. 
This change in membership of the Security Council promised a voting 
alignment supporting stronger action by the Council, because the Nether­
lands lost the support of Belgium in the Security Council. The major 
powers were divided in their views on the situation. The representative 
of the Soviet Union declared that the Security Council had not dealt 
with the Indonesian question firmly and effectively enough to put an 
end to the Dutch aggression. He described the Committee of Good Offices
68Ibid.
^^O.R.S.C., Third Year, 3951i Meeting, (28 December 1948), $1.
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as weak, ineffective and overly protective of the colonial interests of
the Netherlands.^^
The representative of the Ukraine who shared the opinion of the
Soviet Union, declared that the majority of the Security Council led by
the United States, ”/haÿ’ by its conduct in the Indonesian question,
substantially assisted and encouraged the aggression by the Netherlands
71Government against the Indonesian Republic,"
The representative of the United States reaffirmed the position 
which his Government had taken toward the Indonesian question since 
August 1947. The United States Government offered its assistance in 
solving the Indonesian problem, but it did not want to resort to actions 
which might open legal questions— questions such as whether the Indo­
nesian Republic was a sovereign state, or under what Article of the 
Charter the United Nations should discuss the issue. The United States 
representative stated that his delegation was not satisfied with the
72Netherlands action.
The representatives of France and Belgium claimed tnat the 
Security Council's competence in the Indonesian question had not been 
decided. The Republic did not qualify as a state within the meaning of 
the Charter. They believed that the Security Council could only offer 
its good offices. They described the Netherlands action as brutal and 
shocking but did not believe that this feeling should alter legal
'̂ Îbid., 391st Meeting, (23 December 1948), 29-30* 
"^Ibid., 393rd Meeting, (27 December 1948), 4. 
7^Ibid., 22.
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73considerations. The United Kingdom, though it shared with France and
Belgium their doubts about the Security Council’s competence in dealing
with the Indonesian question, supported the Security Council’s resolu-
75tion of 24 December 1948, because it regarded the situation in 
Indonesia as "pregnant with consequences for Indonesia, for all Powers 
which have the privilege of administering colonies ... and for the whole 
world.
When the Security Council reconvened on 7 January 1949, it was
informed by the representative of Indonesia and by the Committee of
Good Offices that although cessation of hostilities had been ordered by
the Netherlands Government, shooting had not ceased. The President of
77the Republic and the other political leaders had not been released. 
Effective cease hostility orders, the Committee of Good Offices reported 
to the Security Council, should be agreed upon by the two parties.
Since the Republican political leaders were imprisoned, there was no 
authority on the Republican side to implement the Council’s resolution?^
^Yearbook of the United Nations, (1948-1949), 215.
74O.R.S.C., Third Year, 396th Meeting, (29 December 1948), 29.
"̂ Ô.R.S.C., Third Year, 392nd Meeting, (24 December 1948), 38- 
760_.R.S.C., Loc. cit.
77q ,r .S.C., Fourth Year, 397th Meeting, (7 January 1949)» 13-14.
78O.R.S.C., Fourth Year, Supplements and Special Supplement, (1949). 
Supplement for January, Document S/l223, (24 January 1949), 60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V 
INDEPENDENCE
A. The Establishment of the United Nations Comission for Indonesia
The focus of the discussion of the Security Council on the 
Indonesian question during the month of January 19^9 was on a joint 
draft resolution by Cuba, Norway, the United States and China. This 
joint draft resolution was adopted by the Security Council on 28 January 
1949. The Security Council acted promptly and decisively in this 
resolution. It transformed the Committee of Good Offices into the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia, with greater authority and 
responsibility than its predecessor. It called upon the Dutch Govern­
ment to discontinue all military operations and the Republic to order 
its army to cease guerrilla ̂ larfare immediately. The Netherlands was 
asked to release all political prisoners arrested since 17 December 
1948, and to facilitate the immediate return of Republican officials to 
Jogjakarta. The Security Council also recommended that the parties 
should resort to negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of 
establishing an Interim Federal Goverment not later than 15 March 1949; 
that elections for an Indonesian Constituent Assembly be formed by 
1 October 19'49t and that the transfer of sovereignty take place not later 
than 1 July 1950.'̂ ^
B. The Round Table Conference and its Results
The Security Council reconsidered the question of Indonesia on 10
79For the full text see Appendix A, the fifth resolution, I30.
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March 1949. On the same day, the Security Council discussed the first 
report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), which 
reported that hostages ■ had not been released. The Dutch Government 
refused to re-establish the Republican Government at Jogjakarta, The 
Dutch Government, the report continued, suggested a round-table con­
ference on the Indonesian question, to be held at the Hague on 12 March 
1949. The Republican, the Federeralists, a group which represented 
areas of Indonesia other than the Republic, as well as the United
Nations Commission for Indonesia were invited to sit at the proposed 
80conference.
The purpose of the conference, according to the representative of 
the Netherlands, was to effect a compromise between the United Nations 
resolution of 28 January 1949, and the Netherlands* objections to some 
parts of it; to gather the parties, including the Federalists, in order 
to arrange all the necessary steps for a transfer of the sovereignty 
within a few months; to establish, in the meantime, the Netherlands- 
Indonesian Union and to form a representative federal government for 
the whole of Indonesia. There were two advantages, he informed the 
Council, in having this conference; first, it would save a whole year 
in the transferring of the sovereignty; second, it would reduce the 
transition period greatly. The major difference, the representative 
added, between the United Nations resolution and the Dutch plan lay in 
the matter of the re-establishment of the Republican Government. He 
asked the Council to permit the United Nations Commission for
80'Yearbook of the United Nations, (1948-1949), 223.
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81Indonesia to participate in the conference.
The representative of the Republic, basing his opinion on the 
Netherlands action in the past, expressed his distrust of the new 
proposal. The new proposal, the representative declared, aimed at 
reducing the power of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The 
representative of India and Australia backed up these views and stated 
that the new scheme was a reversal of the Council's resolution merely
82because the Netherlands objected to some parts of it.
The discussion of the Netherlands proposal in the Security Council 
led to the adoption of a Canadian resolution on 23 March 1949. The 
Security Council in this resolution requested the United Nations Com­
mission for Indonesia to assist the parties to reach an agreement on the 
time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at the Hague. 
Furthermore, the Commission was asked by the Council to assist the 
parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of the Council’s 
resolution of 28 January 1949.
The representatives of the United States, Britain, China, Canada
and Norway emphasized "that military action could not be allowed to
83eliminate one of the parties before the Security Council. " They also 
declared that if the two parties reached an agreement on the terms and 
conditions for having the round-table' conference, such conference would 
be consistent with the major purposes and aims of the Security Council’s 
resolution of 28 January 1949. The named resolution, they added, would
^^Ibid. 
^^Ibid.. 224.
83Ibid.
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remain in full force and effect.
In a report from the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to the 
President of the Security Council, date 9 May 1940, the Security 
Council was informed that the parties would negotiate under the 
guidance of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia and that pre­
liminary negotiations would begin on 14 April 1949. The first important 
development came when Dr. Mohammed Roem, heai of the Republican delegation, . 
declared that President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta promised that, 
immediately after the restoration of the Republican Government to 
Jogjakarta, they would urge cessation of guerrilla warfare, co-operate
in maintaining law and order, and participate in the Round-Table Con- 
84ference.
The chairman of the Netherlands delegation approved of setting up 
joint committees, under the guidance of the United Nations Commission 
for Indonesia, to take preliminary steps to return the Republican 
Government to Jogjakarta. He reaffirmed the Netherlands* willingness to 
stop all military operations immediately and to set free unconditionally 
all those political prisoners who were arrested since 1? December 
1948.^^
The second major development took place when Netherlands troops 
were withdrawn from Jogjakarta and Republican troops reoccupied the 
area. This delicate military operation was completed peacefully on 30 
June 1949» under the supervision of the United Nations military observers.
84United Nations, Security Council, Microprint Edition, Doc., 
S/1320, (9 May 1949).
®^Ibid.
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Six days later, on 6 July, the Republican Government was re­
established at Jogjakarta. Soon after its restoration, the Republican 
Government approved the time and conditions for the Round-Table Con­
ference. On 3 August the Netherlands and the Republican authorities 
issued cease-fire orders simultaneously.
On 23 August 1949 the Round-Table Conference was opened at the 
Hague, and it ended on 2 November 1949. The Conference was composed of 
the representatives of the Governments of the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Indonesia and the Federal Consultative Assembly representing areas 
in Indonesia other than the Republic.
A central Joint Board was established to observe the implementation 
of the cease-hostilities. This Board was to report and make recommen­
dations to the parties and to the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia. Thirteen Local Joint Committees in Java and Sumatra were 
established under the Central Joint Board. Delegations from the 
parties and the United Nations l'ü.litary observers sat on the Local 
Joint Committees. This machinery, though similar to that set up after 
the Renville Agreement, proved to be more useful for implementing the 
truce than the first one. Three main factors led to this change: first, 
the authority was more decentralized; second, the military observers
had more active participation at the local level; and third, the super-
87visory machinery was effectively separated from political negotiations.
G^Yearbook of the United Nations. (1948-1949), 229.
^^J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," Inter, 
national Conciliation. No.459, (March 1950), 186-18?.
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G. The Role of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia
As the Conference continued, its work became more and more 
centered within the Steering Committee, because the parties could not 
arrive at agreements at the lower levels on many substantial issues.
The Steering Committee was made up of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, the 
next ranking member of each delegation, and the representative of the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The heads of the partici­
pating delegations took turns at the chairmanship of the Steering 
Committee a week at a time. The United Nations Commission for Indo­
nesia participated in all meetings of the Steering Committee. Any 
decision of the Conference both on matters of procedure and substance 
had to be agreed to unaminously by the delegations. The United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia was requested to mediate whenever unanimity 
could not be reached. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia
played a vital role by offering compromise solutions which were accept-
88able to both sides.
The major problems on which the parties could not reach an 
agreement at the Round-Table Conference were political, military and 
economic. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia succeeded in 
getting agreement on all these problems.
1. In the Political Field; The Dutch demanded creation of three 
permanent organs for the Netherlands-Indonesian Union: a council of 
ministers; an interparliamentary commission; and a court of justice.
The Republicans regarded the Dutch demand "as trappings of a superstate
^^Ibid.. 188-189.
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that would infringe on their sovereignty rather than necessary concom- 
itant8 of union between two independent nations. The Republicans
asked for complete independence in the economic, military and political
90fields, and for a loose union— a "form of organized co-operation."
They proposed that it would operate only if the two parties agreed "in
91each concrete case."
With the help of the Commission the parties agreed on organized 
co-operation between the independent and sovereign partners on the 
basis of equality and free will. They also agreed to have regular co­
operation between their two Parliaments. The partners further agreed 
to establish a Union Court of Arbitration to settle legal disputes 
arising out of the Union Statute. The chairmanship of this Court would 
rotate annually between Indonesia and Netherlands members. Finally, 
the Netherlands and the Indonesian delegations agreed to set up a
Conference of liinisters, whose acts would have to be ratified by the 
92two Parliaments.
When the question of whether the transfer of sovereignty over 
Indonesia would include the Residency of New Guinea was discussed, a 
sharp difference in opinion developed. The Dutch desired to keep New 
Guinea, but the Indonesian delegation demanded that it should be part 
of the United States of Indonesia. Finally, the United Nations
O q
New York Times. (10 September 1949)» 5.
^^Ibid., (6 September 1949), 20.
^^Ibid., (16 September 1949), 8.
92O.R.S.C., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No.6, Doc., S/1417, 
(10 November 1949), 16-17.
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Commission for Indonesia proposed as a compromise that the status quo 
of the Residency of New Guinea should be maintained. It should 
continue under the Dutch Government, on condition that within a year 
from the date of transfer of sovereignty the political status of New 
Guinea must be determined through negotiations between the two parties. 
Both the Netherlands and the Indonesian delegations accepted the
93suggestions. Although the Commission did not find a final solution 
for the dispute over New Guinea, the agreement was very important 
because any delay at that grave time was a threat to the truce agree­
ment between the two parties.
Another political problem was the question of the right of self- 
determination of the Indonesians territories. There was no provision 
in the Provisional Constitution for self-determination— that is the 
right of the Indonesians to disassociate their respective territories 
from the Republic of United States of Indonesia, The Netherlands 
delegation attached special importance to this question and it was 
discussed at length. However, the parties were not able to reach an 
agreement until the last day of the Conference when they accepted a 
compromise solution proposed by the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia (UNCI). This proposal provided that a plebiscite be held 
among the peoples of those territories upon the recommendation of the 
Commission or another organ of the United Nations, to determine whether 
those territories should form separate component States. The United 
Nations Conmission for Indonesia — or another United Nations agency—
^^Ibid.
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94was to supervise these plebiscites.
2. In the Military Field; The Dutch demanded that its troops should 
remain in Indonesia until the United States of Indonesia completed a 
year of governmental administration. The Indonesian delegation pro­
posed that the Dutch troops should be withdrawn immediately after the
95transfer of sovereignty. There were also technical military 
problems, financial-economic questions in the military field upon 
which the parties were unable to reach an agreement.
But finally with the assistance of the Military Committee of the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia, the parties agreed upon the 
following : 1. The government of the United States of Indonesia would 
be responsible for the internal security and external defense of 
Indonesia; 2. The Dutch fighting forces would be withdrawn from Indo­
nesia after the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indo­
nesia; 3* The Netherlands would send a military mission to Indonesia
96to help the Republic bo build up its fighting forces.
3* In the Economic Field; A great threat to negotiations at the Round- 
Table Conference was the economic deadlock,There was a sharp dispute 
over the assumption of debts by the new state. There were also dif­
ferences of opinions over the means through which the Netherlands could 
protect its investments and other economic interests in Indonesia. A
94Ibid., 19-20.
95New York Times. (16 October 1949), 7.
^^O.R.S.C., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No.6, Doc., s/l4iy, 
(10 November 1949), 26-2?.
97New York Times. (1 October 1949), 6.
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vital role was played by the Commission in bringing the parties to an
agreement on these issues, which in effect amounted to arbitration by 
98the Commission.
The United Nations Commission for Indonesia declared that the
results of the negotiations at the Round-Table Conference were
"eminently successful," and the Commission reported that the Conference
had reached agreement on all issues which were before it. One of the
main results of the Conference was the transfer of real, complete and
99unconditional sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Article 
1, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty states 
that, "the Kingdom of Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably 
transfers complete sovereignly over Indonesia to the Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia and thereby recognize the said Republic of
ICOthe United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State."
Paragraph three of the same Article states that "the transfer of the
sovereignty will take place at the latest on 30 December 1949."̂ *̂ ^
A second major result was a draft defining the status of a
Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. It was agreed
between the parties that the Union would be established "on the basis
102of free will and equality in status with equal rights." The parties
Collins, Loc. cit., 189•
99 /O.R.S.C., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No.6, Doc., S/1417,
(10 November 1949)* 37.
^Q^Ibid., Doc., S/I4l7/Add.l, Appendix VII, 91.
^°^Ibid.
^°^Ibid., 95.
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also agreed that the "Union does not prejudice the status of each of
103of the Partners as an independent and sovereign State.*
The third important result was the agreement on the transitional 
measures, including agreement on major problems such as: the right of 
self-determination of the territories of Indonesia; debt settlement; 
regulations concerning the monetary system and issue of currency in 
Indonesia; and co-operation in the field of commercial policy.
The Security Council considered the report of the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia on 12 December 1949» at its 455th and 456th 
meetings. The representative of Canada submitted a draft resolution, 
in which he proposed that the Security Council should note "with 
satisfaction the report of the Commission on the Round-Table Conference, 
congratulate the parties on reaching agreement, and welcome the 
establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an
105independent sovereign state." Furthermore, the draft resolution 
requested the Commission to continue to discharge its responsibilities 
and "to observe and assist in the implementation of the agreements 
reached at the Round-Table Conference.
The results of the Round-Table Conference at the Hague were, in 
the words of Mr. Herremans, Chairman of the week of the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia, "the end of a conflict, the solution of a
^^^Ibid.. 19-23.
^^%ntemational Organization: Summary of Activities of the United 
Nations Security Council— The Indonesian Question," International 
Organization, IV, 1950, 108.
^°^Ibid.
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107problem, the birth of a nation and the foundation of a Union."
The representative of the Netherlands declared that the United
Nations Commission for Indonesia played a vital role in solving the
complex problem. He also believed that the initiative taken by his
Government in asking for a Round-Table Conference was very wise and 
108fortunate.
Mr. Palar, the representative of Indonesia, declared the satis­
faction of his Government with the results of the Round-Table 
Conference. He stated that the "work of the United Nations Commission 
had been and would continue to be most important
A majority of the Security Council supported the Canadian draft 
resolution. After the statements of the representatives of the Nether­
lands and the Republic of Indonesia, the representatives of Norway, 
Pakistan, and China praised the achievements of the Conference and 
congratualed the parties. However, the representatives of the 
Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union took an isolated position. The 
Ukrainian representative stated that "the agreements that were reached 
at the Round-Table Conference in The Hague were not capable of leading 
to a solution of the question; the agreements were not in accordance
with the wishes of the Indonesian people, who were not truly repre-
110sented by the government of the Hatta clique."
^^^O.R.S.C., Fourth Year, 455th Meeting, (12 December 1949). 5* 
^Q^Ibid.. 4.
^^%ntemational Organization: 'Summary of Activities of the United 
Nations Security Council— The Indonesian Question," International 
Organization, IV, 1950. 108.
^°Ibid., 109.
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Furthermore, the Ukrainian representative submitted a resolution 
in which he asked for the dissolution of the Ikiited Nations Commission 
for Indonesia. The representative of the Soviet Union supported the 
views of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR and his resolution.
He also stated i±iat "-ttie text of The Hague agreements /madeT" it clear 
that the freedom and independence of Indonesia /had/” been sacrificed on 
the altar of political and economical interests of a bloc of colonial
powers, the United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and
,,111 others."
Mr. Gross, the representative of the United States, took a i ' 
position opposite to that of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR.
Mr. Gross considered the agreements reached at the Round-Table Confer­
ence as very successful and as a "striking example of a way in which 
the primary purpose of this Organization can be carried into action."
The Ukrainian resolution was rejected by the Security Council.
The representative of the Soviet Union vetoed the Canadian resolution, 
which asked for the continuation of the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia to assist the parties in implementing the agreements. How­
ever, despite the veto of the Canadian resolution, the previous 
Security Council’s resoltuion, which authorized the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia to assist the parties in the implementation 
of future agreement, remained in full effect and unimpaired^^^
^^Ibid., 110.
^^^O.R.S.C,, Fourth Year, 456th Meeting, (13 December 1949). 15* 
^^Ibid., 36.
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The United Nations General Assemby adopted a resolution at its 
272nd meeting on ? Decanber 1949, which read as follows:
Th& General fssembly.
1. kfelcomes the annomcement that an agreement was reached at 
the Round Table Conference held at The Hague between
23 August and 2 November 1949;
2. Commends the parties concerned and the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia for their contributions thereto;
3. Welcomes the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of 
the United States of Indonesia as an independent, sovereignState.114
The Commission returned to Batavia, when the Round-Table Conference 
was over, "to observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements" 
arrived at by the Conference. It continued its task of observation of 
the vmthdrawal of Dutch troops until completed in April 1951* After 
the corrç)lete withdrawal of the Dutch troops, the United Nations Com­
mission for Indonesia relieved its military observers, and adjourned 
sine die. However, even after the sine die adjournment, the Commission 
remained at the disposal of the parties.
On 28 December 1949, Mr. Lie, the Secretary General, was formally 
informed by Dr. H. Riemans, acting Dutch representative to the United 
Nations, that:
the round-table agreements had been ratified by both houses 
of the Dutch Parliament and by the representatives of the 
states and territories which were to form the United States 
of Indonesia, and that the transfer of sovereignty over the 
entire Netherlands East Indies, with exception of,Netherlands 
New Guinea, took place this morning in Amsterdam. ^
114united Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly. 
Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, Annex to the Summary Records of 
Meetings, Agenda Item 20, Doc., A/Ac. Jl/L. 50» (7 December 1949),
59.
115New York Times. (28 December 1949). ?•
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D. Change in the Federal Status
At the Round-Table Conference a major point for discussion was the 
right of the Indoneâan territories to determine vÆiat type and form of 
government they would have* The Netherlands and the Indonesian delega­
tions agreed upon a Netherlands-Indonesia Union and the transfer of 
sovereignty over Indonesia from the Netherlands to the Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia, which would have a federal form of govern­
ment. However, after sovereignty was transferred, the Republican 
leaders proceeded to form a unitary form of government.
On 25 May 1950» the Netherlands High Commissioner sent a letter to 
the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, in which he expressed his
Government’s concern over the right of self-determination, and inquired
116how this right could be carried into effect in a unitary state.
On 8 June 1950, the Indonesian Prime Minister informed the United 
Nations Commission for Indonesia that the right of self-determination 
of the Indonesian people could be guaranteed by establishing autonomous 
provinces or communities. Furthermore, he added, preparations were 
being made to hold general elections to a constituent assembly. The 
constituent assembly, together with the government, would enact the 
final constitution "displaying the real democratic features of the
117unitary state."
Subsequently, the Commission felt it necessaiy to declare its 
position on the question. And on 24 June 1950» the Commission stated
116
Yearbook of the United Nations, (Published by Columbia Univer­
sity Press, New York in co-operation with the United Nations), 1950,
303.
^^Ibid.
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its position in a letter to the two parties;
/The/" obligation to implement the Round-Table Conference 
Agreements, including the Agreement on Transitional Measures, 
rested with the two Governments concerned. Although the 
Commission, as an organ of the United Nations, had participated 
in the Round-Table Conference and signed its Covering Resolution, 
it could not be considered a party to this Agreement;
Consequently, the Commission had so far regarded it as 
inappropriate to take action on the basis of the provisions 
of the Round-Table Conference Agreement without first being 
approached in the matter by at least one of the parties.11°
On 15 August 1950» President Soekarno abolished the federated
'United States of Indonesia' and declared the unified 'Republic of
Indonesia' to take its place. He announced that he would continue as
President and that Jogjakarta would be the capital of the new state.
It was not until five years later, on 29 September 1955, that the
first general election for the house of representatives was held. Then
on 15 December 1955» the constituent assembly was elected.
The sixteen federal states that formed the United States of
Indonesia in December 1949, began a new phase of their career on
17 August 1950, when they consolidated and formed the Republic of
Indonesia^as a unitary State.
^^^Ibid.. 304.
 ̂̂ ̂ Britannica Book of the Year, (1957), 409.
^^^New York Times. (1? August 1950), 20.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
What was the role of the United Nations in this successful settle­
ment? What measures did the Security Council follow in order to arrive 
at a lasting settlement? How has the Netherlands reacted toward those 
measures? Where was the turning point at which the Dutch Government 
started seriously to co-operate with the United Nations in solving the 
problem by transferring the sovereignty? What were the factors which 
led to this turning point, or this change? And finally, what were the 
factors which enabled the United Nations to play such a successful 
role ?
The Security Council played a major role in settling the problem 
peacefully. It took prompt measures whenever it deemed them necessary. 
It helped to keep the world well informed about the situation in 
Indonesia. It tendered its mediation and aid during the transition 
period through the United Nations Commission for Indonesia.
A. The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations
Although the resolutions of the United Nations were not fully 
effective in the short run, they played an invaluable role in finding 
a peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question.
The Security Council was informed of hostilities in Indonesia on
30 July 1947. It placed the Indonesian question on its agenda on
31 July 1947. On 1 August^ the-yery next day* the Security Council 
adopted a resolution which asked the parties to cease hostilities, to 
settle their dispute by peaceful means and to keep the Council informed
52
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of the progress toward settlement. Three days later, the resolution 
was accepted by the parties, but almost immediately afterwards hostil­
ities started again with each party claiming that the other had 
violated the cease-fire order.
The Security Council at this stage was faced with two main 
problems. The first was to ensure the effectiveness of the resolution 
of 1 August, and the second was to achieve a lasting settlement. The 
Security Council reminded the parties on 25 August of its first 
resolution. It then created the Career Consulars Commission which was 
asked to submit a joint report to the Council as to the manner in which 
the cease-hostilities order was being observed. As far as its second 
problem was concerned, the Security Council, acting upon an American 
proposal, tendered its good Offices to the parties and established the 
Committee of Good Offices (COO) as its rqjresentative. These steps 
were taken in order to assist the parties to reach a durable settle­
ment.
The Committee of Good Offices played a major role in leading the 
parties to signing the Renville Truce Agreement, on 1? January 1948. 
This agreement was one of the major agreements between the two parties, 
second only to the Linggadjati Agreement. The parties agreed on major 
political issues as a basis for the negotiations, and they agreed upon 
many other important points all of which were supposed to solve the 
problem peacefully.
However, the hostilities did not cease completely. Mutual 
distrust and suspicion increased. The severe economic blockade by the 
Dutch on the Republic was strengthened and the political negotiations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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moved from bad to worse. The Security Council asked the Committee of 
Good Offices, on 25 June 1948, to continue its efforts to improve the 
situation peacefully. On 29 July 1948, the Security Council called 
upon the parties to observe strictly the military and economic articles 
of the Renville Agreement.
The Committee of Good Offices lost confidence in itself in solving 
the problem. The Netherlands Government was persistent in its demands, 
and the Committee was not able to satisfy them. Finally, on 12 December 
1948, the Committee of Good Offices reported to the Security Council 
that direct talks between the parties had collapsed. Seven days later, 
on 19 December, the Dutch began their second major military attack and 
imprisoned the Republican political leaders, including President 
Soekamo and Vice President Hatta.
B. The Role of the United Nations— Conciliation
The Security Council acting promptly and decisively passed several 
resolutions, which asked the parties to cease hostilities and requested 
the Netherlands to release the Indonesian political leaders. One of 
the most important resolutions was that of 28 January 1949. In this 
resolution the Security Council transformed the Committee of Good 
Offices into the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI). The 
Commission had more authority and power than its predecessor. Unlike 
the Committee of Good Offices the United Nations Commission for Indo­
nesia was empowered to make recommendations to the parties and to the 
Security Council, and it was authorized to consult with representatives 
of territories other than the Republic and to ask them to participate 
in the negotiations. The Commission had the duty to observe elections
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that were to be held throughout Indonesia, and to help in accomplishing 
the restoration of the civil administration of the Republic as early as 
possible.
The Netherlands refused to comply fully with the Security Councils 
resolution and proposed a round-table conference which finally led, in 
December 1949, to tJie transfer of the Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia 
to United States of Indonesia,
The United Nations Commission for Indonesia played a vital role in 
assisting the parties to reach a lasting agreement at the Round-Table 
Conference. The parties turned to the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia for recommendations and compromises i/dienever an impasse 
occurred. The Commission made it possible for the Conference to find 
solutions or acceptable compromises for most of the problems r̂tiich were 
before it, in the political, economic and military fi.elds. Any serious 
delay in solving these problems might have led to the end of the truce 
agreement between the two parties. Actually, it was not until the 
beginning of the Round-Table Conference that the Dutch tried seriously 
to make use of the assistance of the United Nations agency on important 
issues. This fact is one of the main factors vAiich led to the final 
success of the Conference,
How did the Netherlands react toward the Security Council’s 
resolutions? The Netherlands, from the beginning of the dispute until 
its proposal of the Round-Table conference (after the second major 
military action), gave the impression that it was trying its utmost to 
preserve the colonial status of Indonesia.
After the Security Council's cease-fire order of 1 August 194?,
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the Dutch, although accepting the resolution in words, did not do so in
reality. Long after that resolution, the Netherlands captured many
important towns in the Republic. The Netherlands continued strong
economic blockades. Many areas in the Republic thus became deficient
in food, medical equipment and clothes.
The Dutch, in spite of the continuation of the military attack
and the severe economic blockade on the Republic, tried to make use of
indirect rule in order to destroy the Republic. For example the Dutch,
through those Indonesians who preferred the Netherlands rule - to that of
the nationalists, were able to insure more effective control over East
Indonesia. In return, this group obtained governmental positions in 
121that area. Finally, the uncompromising position which they took in 
December 1948, and the second military attack on the Republic were 
other good examples of Dutch intentions to destroy the Republic.
C. Factors Which Led to the Change in the Dutch Policy in Indonesia 
The change in the Dutch policy in Indonesia came about after the 
Dutch proposal for the Round-Table Conference at the Hague. There 
were many factors which led to this change in the Netherlands policy in 
Indonesia. Certainly, the pressure from the members of the Security 
Council on the Dutch Government, the strong resistance of the Indonesian 
citizenry to accepting Dutch rule, the change in the Dutch government, 
and the inability of the Dutch to finance the large army and the long 
struggle, are some of the major factors in that change. The Dutch 
lacked the power to continue the war.
121George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism ^ d  Revolution in Indonesia, 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), 1952, 365»
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The British since 30 July 19^7. forbade the selling of war
materials to the Netherlands for use in Indonesia and the United States
122followed suit shorty after. The pressure on the Dutch increased 
when the United States Senate announced it was following closely the 
course of events and the Dutch actions in Indonesia; and was prepared 
to use severe economic sanctions in case the Dutch continued their
123defiance of the Security Council's resolutions. Aside from
the action which.,W&s taken by the United.LSi^tes and Great Britaip, in 
January 1949, all transit facilities, both sea and air, were ifithdrawn 
from the Dutch by India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Saudi Arabia.
The Dutch, at first, accused some of the nationalist leaders of 
being communists and accused the Republican Government as a whole of 
being unable to fight communism in that area. The suppression of the 
communist revolt in Indonesia by the Republican Government in September 
1948 proved the opposite. The suppression of this revolt by the 
Republican Government undercut much of the support the Dutch were 
receiving from the western major powers.
The Republican leaders realized that the Dutch did not have the 
power to control the ^ole territory of the Republic or the money to 
keep thousands of soldiers in action. Thus, the Republican leaders 
decided to leave the cities and go to the countryside to fight the 
Dutch from there. An observer who visited Jogjakarta in January 1949» 
found tile situation in areas under the Dutch control different from
^^Ibid., 214.
^^3Congressional Record-Senate. 81st Congress, 1st Session, VC, 
Part III, C5 April 1949), 3839-3848.
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■what the Netherlands was telling the world. The majority of the
populations in those areas were women, children, and old men. Most of
1Ẑ ■the young men were fighting outside these areas.
Besides the Republican military resistance after the second major 
mili'tary action, the ci'vllians in the areas which the Dutch liberated 
were hostile and did not co-operate with the Dutch. As George Kahin 
s"bates in his book, Nationalism and the Revolution in Indonesia, "out 
of 10,000 civil servants in Jogjakarta /there were/"no more than I50,
... /wh^ were working for the Dutch administration," This 
resis'tance convinced the Dutch leaders, who believed that the Republican 
Government did not represent the majority of the Indonesian people, 
that the Indonesian citizens truly desired independence.
Another important factor influencing modifications in the Nether­
lands policy "toward Indonesia was the change of the Dutch Government 
in August 1948. The Dutch Government, before 1948, was conservative 
and believed that "the nationalist movement was confined to a minority 
group of the Indonesian people and had a strong desire "to keep Indonesia 
under its rule for different reasons. This Government felt responsible 
for the peace and security in Indonesia and distrusted the nationalist 
leaders who formed the Republic of Indonesia. There were many Indo­
nesians who preferred to see Indonesia under Dutch rule. These people 
were those who had been appointed to governmental positions by the 
Dutch and were sure that they would lose their positions if the 
nationalists ruled Indonesia, The Dutch Government was in touch mainly
^^Kahin, Op. cit.4 394. 
^^^Ibid., 396.
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•with these Indonesians, a fact #iich made the Dutch underestimate the
Indonesian resistance to its rule. There was also a fear of the
threat of communism, if incapable leaders took the rule in Indonesia.
Finally, "the Dutch Government wanted to protect its economic interests
as well as "to prevent economic disaster in Indonesia.
The new Cabinet of August 1948 was Liberal Socialist. This
Cabinet had à different policy than its predecessor. It did not
consider the nationalist movement as confined to a minority group of
intellectuals, but as a movement clearly reflected what was living in
the masses. The leaders of the new Dutch government were determined
to end the deadlock with the Indonesian- Republic, and were capable of
mustering strong support in the Netherlands parliament. And although
they were sensitive to the Netherlands national interests, they had no
126sentimental attachment to Indonesia.
D. Factors that Assisted the United Nations "bo Play a Vi-bal Role in 
Finding Peaceful Settlement*
The change in Dutch policy toward Indonesia was one important 
factor Tdiich helped the United Nations.,to act successfully. However, 
there were other important factors lAiich helped the United Nations to 
find a peaceful and lasting settlement. First, the Netherlands was not 
a permanent member in "the Security Council with a veto power, and was 
not able to prevent the Security Council from passing resolutions 
•which the Netherlands did not approve.
Second, it was not as closely allied with a major power such as
^^^Whiteny T. Perkins, "Sanctions for Political Change— The 
Indonesian Case," International Organization, XII, (Winter 1958)» 38-
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Great Britain and the United States or the United States and France. 
However, it did have something which tied it with France and Great 
Britain. It was a colonial power. Although, France and Great Britain 
supported the Dutch position on many occasions and questioned the 
competence of the Security Council in dealing with the question, this 
tie was not strong enough to make these powers veto any major resolu­
tion in the Security Council. As a matter of fact Great Britain voted 
for the Security Council's resolution of 24 December 1948, in which 
the Security Council asked for cessation of hostilities and the release 
of the Republican leaders.
Third, the United States, with its power in the Security Council, 
played a major role in helping the Republic of Indonesia to obtain her 
independence. The United States made the passage of the Australian 
resolution (1 August 194?) possible when it amended that resolution in 
a way which eliminated legal questions which might have led to a 
long debate. The United States played a very important role in the 
drawing up of the Renville Agreement. The Netherlands' twelve prin­
ciples were not clear at all, so clarification was asked by the 
Republic. There was no time for negotiation between the parties, but 
Dr. Graham, the United States' delegate to the Committee of Good 
Offices, helped persuade the Republicans to agree to the twelve 
principles. The Committee of Good Offices then proposed the six 
additional points which defined the status of the Republic as "a state 
within the United States of Indonesia," and provided United Nations 
supervision of plebiscites to determine whether the people of various 
territories in Indonesia vri-shed to form part of the Republic or to
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constitute separate states within the United States of Indonesia. How­
ever, the promised plebiscites were not held; the federated 'United 
States of Indonesia' was abolished by President Soekarno and a unified 
•Republic of Indonesia' was declared to take its place on 15 August
3950.^^’̂
The Renville Agreement, though it gave the Dutch territory which
was taken after the cease-fire resolution, helped the Republic to
maintain its international standing and insured the Republic that it
128could keep its army and its foreign relations. It was also the 
United States who proposed the establishment of the United Nations
r*.
Commission for Indonesia, which had greater power than the Committee of 
Good Offices. And, finally, through the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia the United States helped greatly at the Round-Table Conference 
at the Hague which settled the problem.
Fourth, the United Nations, from the very beginning of the dispute, 
did not engage itself with legal questions. When Australia referred to 
Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations in its draft 
resolution of 1 August 194?, the United States offered an amendment 
that excluded reference to these Articles or any other Article of the 
Charter. Such reference would have opened conplex legal issues. The 
amendment which was adopted by the Security Council merely recognized 
that fighting on a large scale was taking place in Indonesia and con­
sidered such conditions as a threat to the peace in that region. 
Furthermore, on 26 August 194?, the Security Council rejected the
^^^See p.p.50-51. 
128Ibid.. 42-43.
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the Belgian proposal to ask the International Court of Justice for an 
advisory opinion on the competence of the Security Council to deal 
with the Indonesian question. The fact that the Security Council did 
not agree to engage in legal subtleties speeded its action to a final 
successful settlement.I
Fifth, the super-powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) 
agreed that the United Nations should play a role in settling the 
problem. Without such an agreement the United Nations would not have 
operated as successfully as it did. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union were for the independence of the Indonesian Republic, 
although they opposed each other as to the means to be followed. When­
ever the two super-powers did not veto each other!s action, there was 
a good possibility for final solution.
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CHAPTER VII 
BACKGROUND
The outbreak of the Algerian revolution, on 1 November 195^» 
destroyed the widely held conviction in the western world that this 
French North African Province was secured against the nationalist 
convulsion which France had faced in Tunisia and Morocco.
Despite the fact that simultaneous attacks on police and military 
posts, factories, bridges, railways, radio and telephone stations were 
clearly well co-ordinated, most French observers regarded the revolu­
tion as a small scale disturbance which a small concerted military 
effort could quickly overcome. But when hundreds, then thousands of
French troops, many tanks and planes failed to restore order, the true
129nature of the revolution became evident.
What were the major factors which led to the nationalist 
revoltuion? What were the French views on this problem? Who were the 
revolutionaries? Could we consider the Algerian question as an inter­
national problem? Where did the major powers stand with regard to this 
problem? What was the role of the United Nations in its attempt to 
solve the problem? And finally, why has the Algerian problem not 
been solved during the past six years?
A. Major Factors Which Led to the Revolution.
One major factor which led to the Algerian revolution was the rise 
of nationalism in the Afro-Asian countries, particularly after World
129xorna H. Hahn, "Algeria : The End of an Era," Middle Eastern 
Affairs. (August-September, I956), VII, 286.
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War II, The Algerian Moslems objected to being ruled by a non-Moslem 
people. In addition, the success of Libya, Tunisia and Morocco in 
their struggle for independence encouraged the Algerian nationalists 
to revolt.
A second important factor was the feeling of not having national
identity. The basic policy of the French Government did not consider
Algeria as a territory which should be steered toward independence, nor
130did it consider Algeria as a colony, but rather as part of France.
The Algerian person was frustrated by the fact that although his
status was that of a French citizen, he was not treated as one. He had
131"keen realization of social, financial and political discrimination’.'
Furthermore the Algerian individual felt neglected. His standard 
of living and educational level was much lower than that of the French 
people. Edward Behr stated in his article, "The Algerian Dilemma" that 
he had been told by an Algerian: "When the rebellion started, we never 
imagined it would cause such a stir.... We thought we had been forgotten. 
The only Frenchman I had ever seen was the gendarme, coming to arrest 
people."
The income of the Algerian Moslem people was lower than that of 
the French. Although theoretically there was equal pay for equal work, 
this did not prevent discrimination in hiring and promotion. At the 
bottom, there was the rural class, which formed sixty five per cent of
130Edward Behr, "The Algerian Dilemma," International Affairs. 
(July, 1958), XXXIV, 280.
^3^Ibid.. 284.
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the population, received an average of $55 per capita a year. The 
urban class received $164 a year per capita. The two classes combined 
form 93 per cent of the Moslem population and have a per capita income 
of $78.49 a year. The remainder of the population’s income— excluding
133the European settlers— was not much higher than the two classes.
The standard of education is very low in Algeria; elementary 
schools are provided for about fifteen per cent of the Moslem popula­
tion but there are enough for all the Europeans. This imbalance is
found not only in the elementary schools, but in institutions of higher
learning as well.^^
A third factor which led to the revolution was the nature and 
actions of most of the political leaders in France and Algeria. It 
was observed that most of the large French landowners who had gone into 
politics had put their own interest far above that of the Algerians. 
Their main objective was to maintain the status quo.^^^
A final factor for the Algerian discontent rose out of the past 
two decades. The vast majority of the Algerian Moslems "gradually grew 
up to believe that they were neither being steered towards political 
maturity and a larger share in the government of their country, nor
\7&s any effort really being made to turn them into full French
136citizens."
133M.M. Knight, "The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors," 
Middle East Journal, (Autumn, 1958), X, 359.
^^Knight, Loc, cit.
^̂ •̂ Behr, Loc. cit., 282.
^^^Ibid,. 383.
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B. The French Views on the Algerian Problem
France insisted that the Algerian revolution was a political cam­
paign organized by a minority. This campaign would have failed had it 
not been supplied by certain countries (such as Egypt and Tunisia) with 
money, arms, directives and even bases of operations. France, also, 
declared that the terrorist’s organizations of the communists had 
merged with those of the National Liberation Front and had infiltrated 
rebel bands.
The Foreign Minister of France informed the United Nations General 
Assembly that the economic expansion of Algeria had always been 
France’s chief concern. Algeria had less than two million inhabi­
tants when France entered in I83O. Algeria was ravaged by epidemics 
and torn by dissension. It had obsolete institutions and lacked 
cultural life. But after I830, and as a result of the French effort to 
improve situation through civilizing missions, infant mortality 
decreased from fifty per cent in I83O to 8.5 per cent in 1956 and the 
population increased to over nine millons. The problem of poverty was 
due mainly to the fact that the increase in productivity did not keep 
pace with the rapid increase in population. Every year food had to be 
found for an additional 225,000 inhabitants in that area. The produc­
tion of the country had to be further increased to meet the additional 
demand.
137Yearbook of the United Nations, (Published by Columbia Univer­
sity Press, New York in co-operation with the United Nations), 1957>68-69.
138United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Eleventh Session, First Committee, Part I, Summary Records of Meetings, 
830th Meeting, (4 February 1957h  100. Hereafter cited as O.R.G.A.. 
with appropriate year, meeting and page citation following.
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Education was spread among the farmers by France, the Foreign 
Minister continued, and the farmers were supplied with funds to improve 
and increase productivity. The Committee Piind of the Provident 
Societies distributed, in 195^* 3775 million francs among more than 
6p00,000 Moslems farmers. Modem agricultural methods were introduced 
and the soil yielded larger crops. Irrigating was a major problem in 
Algeria, he added. In the past two decades twelve large dams had been 
constructed. These dams provided water for an area of more than 
100,000 hectares. During the same period 2g$0 kilometers of canals 
were built. Roads, railroads, air fields and harbours was constructed. 
Fhance spent large sums of money to improve the standard of living.
Food production rose steeply; sugar and meat, for an example, doubled 
since 1938; and dairy products tripled. Health conditions improved 
greatly, and compulsory medical care was introduced. In the educa­
tional field, he said, one-sixth of the ordinary budget of Algeria was
139allocated to education.
In the administration field, Mr. Pineau maintained, the French 
Government had simplified idie eligibility requirements for French 
Moslems before they could enter the Civil Service, and gradually 
brought the Algerian people into the management of local and Algerian 
affairs. He added :
The principle underlying that partnership had been laid 
down as early as 1875» The civil registry had been established 
in 1883, and in 1898 the Assembly and the financial delegations 
had rectified the prevailing excessive centralization. Py 
1900, Algeria electorate for the communes de plein exercice 
had been appreciably increased. In 1919. French citizenship 
had been widely granted, and 1937. exclusively Moslem
^^Ibid., 100-101.
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municipalities had been established. Full citizenship had 
been granted to all Algerian Moslems on 7 May 19^6, T-ath the 
result that they were authorized to send fifteen deputies, 
seven senators and nine councillors of the French Union to 
Paris. Finally, the statute of September 194? guaranteed to 
all inhabitants the full rights of French citizens and created 
Algerian Assembly consisting of sixty delegates from each 
college and possessing some measure of legislative autonomy.
Two different views could be found with regard to the general
living conditions and the pace of the progress in the standard of
living in Algeria. Regardless of which was right, one fact remained
true : no matter how high or low the standard of living, and no matter
how muchPbance improved the economic situation in Algeria, the
nationalists still wanted independence.
In 19571 the French spent twelve to thirteen times more on Algeria
than they had done in 1954. excluding the amount which was spent for
the supression of the revolt. This increase was for improvement of
141roads, schools, irrigation and other iiiç)ortant needs. Furthermore,
there was the "Constantine Plan',' announced by de Gaulle, in 1958. and 
designed: first, to raise the Algerian wage levels to those of France; 
second, to reserve one tenth of all military and civil jobs in metro­
politan France for Algerian Moslems; third, to transfer 617.000 acres 
of new land to Algerian farmers; fourth, to make 400,000 new jobs 
available for Algerians through intensified industrialization projects, 
housing constructâm and transportation facilities ; fifth, to provide
^^°Ibid., 101.
141Behr, Loc. cit., 286.
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Ik-Zmore education for the Algerian children. Nevertheless, the 
revolution continued and the rebels still were asking for independence.
C. Who are the Revolutionaries
The history of the national movement in Algeria goes back to 1924, 
•when Mes sali el Haj formed an organization known as Na.jm Shamal 
Ifriquah (Star of North Africa - Etoile Nord Africaine). The aims of 
this organization were "to help the needy Algerians, and to obtain their 
national rights. The French authorities opposed the organization as 
communist affiliated. When the national elements in Algeria rallied 
strongly around Messali, the E~boile was dissolved by a decree issued by 
the French Government in 1937•
The Etoile, shortly after its dissolution, reappeared under the 
name of "The Society of the Friends of Al-Ummaha," Later the name of 
this organization was changed -to the "Algerian People's Party." This 
Party asked for the establishment of consitiutional government and for 
independence. In 1939, the French Government dissolved the People's 
Party, on the grounds it was harmful -to French sovereignty. The ban 
on all political parties continued through the Second World War.
The political parties resumed their acti-vities at the end of 
World War II. The People's Party reappeared, upon the release of 
Messali, under the name of "Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés
142Ann Winslow, Editor-in Chief, "Algeria— Issues Before the 
Fourteenth General Assembly," International Conciliation, Carnegie 
Ihdowment for International Peace, (September 1959), No.524» 43.
^^%ohamed Alwan, Algeria Before the Ui^ted Ndtions, (Robert 
Speller & Sons PublishersT ]hc., New York 3^), 1959, 8-9.
144-^^Ibid.. 9.
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Deomcratiques” (MTLD). This movement, which was led by Messali, asked 
for national independence. However, its followers did not believe in 
achieving independence through military action, but rather through 
negotiation. The French expelled Messali to France in 1952, in order 
to strip his party of experienced leadership^^^
The French Government did not know of a movement called L*Opera­
tion Secrete, developing within the MTLD. The goal of this movement 
was to do something more than talk of independence. Its members, who 
were young men, believed that they should prepare for an armed uprising 
through secret military training. When Messali learned of the aims 
of this movement, in 195 ,̂ he refused to support its views.
His refusal led to a complete division within the MTLD. Messali 
and his followers kept the position and the name of the party for a 
few months. Later Messali regrouped his followers and started a 
military struggle of his own in the southern sectors of Algiers, and 
in the Department of Oran. His movement was known as the Mouvement 
National Algerian, (MNA). In 1955» Messali abandoned his policy of 
wait and see and the MNA through itself into the military activ­
ities with a view to taking over the leadership of the military
* 147 movement.
The L'Operation Secrete members left the Messalist national move­
ment and formed their "Comite révolutionnaire d'unite d'action" (CRUA)
^̂ ■̂ Hahn, Loc. cit., 286.
^^^Ibid., 286-287.
^^^O.R.G.A., Eleventh Session, First Committee, 830th Meeting, 
(4 February 1957), 102.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
in 195^, and set up a liaison center in Cairo. From their office in
Cairo they made political decisions and directed their forces -which
•were called the "Front de Liberation National" (FLN) and began training
people in techniques of guerilla warfare. Their appeal to the Algerian
people was simple— "This is a holy war for the defense of Islam."
Volunteers joined the FLN either as full time soldiers or part time 
148auxiliaries. The FLN grew at the expense of the MNA and became the
largest party in Algeria seeking independence followed by the MNA and
the Communist Party.
The FLN and the MNA were both nationalist groups and it would not
be right -to believe that communism was behind either movement. While
•the FLN was greatly influenced by the United Arab Republic, it leaned
closely toward Western socialist movements and idéologies.
Messali Hadj, idio was considered the father of the Algerian
nationalists, stated his views of the FLN and proposed a solution for
the Algerian problem:
/The FLN were/a heterogeneous group that /contained people 
from ultra-left to ultra right ... There /were/ no doubt, 
valuable elements in the FLN, but "there /was/no chief there.
And that movement /was supported by outside powers who sooner 
or later will present the bill_for their aid. You don't 
believe that Cairo or Moscow /di^ arytüng for no "thing? This 
is not real independence."^5^
He called, as a solution to the problem, for
an independent Algeria colaborate in "the closest possible 
way with France, within the framework of a Common wealth along
^^Hahn, Loc. cit.
^^^Sat Tas, "Inter-view with Messali Hadj," The New Leader, 
(9 March 1959), DLII,
^^°Ibid., 8.
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British lines ... We must break away from revolutionary 
intoxication. We face tremendous economic problems which 
independence alone cannot solve.
The third party which sought Algerian independence was the 
Algerian Communist Party^(PGA). Originally an offshoot of the French 
Communist Party, it became independent in 1935- Immediately after the 
Second World War the PCA canqjaigned for Algeria's integration with 
France only because the French communists were in the Government of 
the Republic and they hoped that they would soon come to power. How­
ever, the communists realized about 1950 that they would be unable to
reach that goal and they switched to a position favoring Algerian 
152independence. This party tried always to exploit the situation for
its own advantages. It was supported only by communists, and all
evidence indicates that it was smaller than the FLN and the MNA.
D. Sources of the F L N's Support and Strength.
The FLN had many sources of arms, medicine, food, clothing and
money. The members of the Arab League regarded it a "solemn obligation"
to assist the Algerian people in their struggles against the French
from the very beginning of the revolution in November, 195^» Ahmed
Shukairi of Syria, Assistant Secretary General of the League, openly
153announced this in the United Nations General Assembly.
Although the Nationalists were anti-communist, the communists in 
Algeria took full advantage of the situation and gave ample propaganda
^^Ibid.
^^^O.R.G.A.. Eleventh Session, First Committee, 830th Meeting, 
(4 February 1957)t 103.
153New York Times. (13 November 195^)» 4.
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154and military support. The Algerian Army received increasing
military support not only from the Arab countries but from the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union. According to a report published
in the Christian Science Monitor, it was estimated that Peking had
given the Algerian underground $60,000,000 in financial aid. Aside
from the material assistance. Red China was training 25,000 volunteers
on the island of Hainan to fight in the future against the French in 
155Algeria. On 16 October I960, Trud, a publication of the Soviet Union 
Central Council Trade Union, announced its largest assistance thus far 
to the Algerians in Tunisia. This aid included machine tools, tractors, 
automobiles, 22,000 cans of meat and fish, 20,000 tins of milk, clothes, 
medicine and soap.^^^
Another source of supply for the rebels were the French. Occasion­
ally the nationalists captured French arms. At times the French 
distributed arms among the Algerians to defend themselves against the 
rebels, but most of these arms were given to the nationalists by the 
Algerians. For example, at the end of 1955, the French administration
distributed thousands of rifles to supposedly loyal Moslems who were to
' 157act as villager guards. I4any of these arms reached the rebels.
E. The French Action.
After the French attempts to suppress the Algerian revolt in its
^^^Hahn, Loc. cit., 292.
^^^The Christian Science Monitor, (28 October I960), 1.
]-56Hew York Times, (17 October I960), 1.
■̂57a Correspondent in Algeria, "How Strong Are Algerià's Rebels?" 
The Economist, (17 March 1956), CLXXVIII, 617.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
earliest stages failed, France acted vigorously to put an end to the 
revolution. She began to increase her forces gradually until they 
reached about half a million troops in 1958. France x-jithdrew four 
divisions of her troops from Western Germany under the NATO supervision 
despite the objections of some NATO powers. France acquired heli­
copters from the United States for fighting revolutionaries and sent
strong troop reinforcements to seal the Tunisian borders and stop the
159aid to the nationalists. Furthermore, the French Army bombed every 
major suspected area as a center of rebel activity and in some cases 
xAere grounds for suspicion were slim. Near.. Constantines at dawn on 
22 August 1955f the French forces leveled nine hamlets to the ground 
charging that they were furnishing the rebel with supplies,This 
incident was not singular.
^58New York Times. (28 March 1955),
159lbid., (11 November 195^)» 3» 
l^Oibid.. (23 August 1955), 5.
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM IN THE UNITED NATIONS
A. The Problem in the Security Council
The representative of Saudi Arabia sent a letter to the President 
of the Security Council dated 5 January 1955. in which he informed the 
President that the situation in Algeria might cause an international 
crisis and endanger the peace and security of the world. The represent­
ative reserved the right of his Government to ask for a meeting of the 
Council to discuss the matter and to take the necessary measures. An 
attached memorandum explained that France was using military operations 
in Algeria to destroy the Algerian nationalists uprising. However, a 
meeting was not requested, and the Security Council did not take action 
at this time.^^^
The situation in Algeria continued to deteriorate. France had 
intensified the use of force in its policy of repression, which was 
costing thousands of l i v e s . O n  13 June 1956, thirteen Afro-Asian 
countries deemed it necessary to request the Security Council for an 
early meeting to discuss the grave situation in that area, under 
Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The Afro-Asian countries 
claimed that the serious situation which existed in Algeria might
l6lunited Nations, Security Council, Microprint Edition, Doc, 
s/3341, (5 January 1955). 1.
I62ibid., Doc., S/3589.- (16 April 1956). 2-3.
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endanger international peace and security.^^^
On 26 June 195^, the Security Council discussed the inclusion of 
the Algerian question on its agenda. The representative of France 
asked the Council not to include the thirteen-delegation complaint on 
its agenda. He considered the Algerian question a domestic problem, 
and invoked Article two, (?), of the Charter of the United Nations, 
which states;
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter ...1^5
He added, that the French Government remained firmly opposed to any
discussion by third parties of domestic affairs, whether these parties
be the General Assembly or the Security Council.
The representatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium and Cuba
supported the French position that the question was of a domestic
nature. The representatives of the United States, Peru, and China
believed that a discussion at that time would not achieve any practical
results and, therefore, they opposed it.^^^
When the Security Council voted on the inclusion of the question,
only Iran and the Soviet Union voted in favor of the provisional
Pq c.*, s/3609, (19 June-1956); It
^^^O.R.S.C.. Eleventh Year, 729t); Meeting. (26 ,June 1956), 5»
^^^Charter of the United Nations, (Department of State Publication 
Conference Series 76),1945,
l66o.R,s.C., Eleventh Year, 729th,Meeting; (26 June 1956), 15.
1^7Yearbook of üie United Nations, 1956, 116.
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agenda. China and Yugoslavia abstained, and the remaining seven members 
of the Security Council voted against it.^^^ Thus the Algerian question 
was not included on the agenda of the Security Council's eleventh 
year or any other year, although the Tunisian question which was 
related to the Algerian problem was included on the Security Council's 
agenda in 1958, as will be discussed later.
B. The Algerian Problem in the General Assembly
1. The Problem in the Tenth Session; On 29 July 1955, fourteen Afro-
Asian states requested the inclusion cf the Algerian question on the 
agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly. These states 
stated, : in an attached memorandum, that the deteriorating situation in 
that area was the direct result of colonial conquest and that France 
controlled Algeria only by force. The attached memorandum declared 
that :
the employment in this region of massiw armed forces totalling 
over 150,000 and including French troops of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization testifies vividly to the grave situation 
existing. The continuance of this situation is creating a
serious threat to peace in the Mediterranean area.189
On 22 September 1955, the General Committee of the General Assembly
recommended to the General Assembly not to include the question of
Algeria on the a g e n d a . W h e n  this recommendation came to the General
Assembly on 27 September 1955» the discussion centered on the competence
^^^O.R.S.C.. Eleventh Year, 730th Meeting, (26 June 1958), 14.
G.A., Tenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 64, Document 
A/2924, (20 September- 20 December 1955), 2.
'̂̂ Ânn Winslow, Editor-in-chief, "Issues Before the Eleventh 
General Assembly— Algeria," International Conciliation, (November 1958), 
No.510, 1943.
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of the United Nations to deal with such a question. Many Afro-Asian 
members questioned French sovereignty over Algeria. They charged that 
the situation in Algeria was a threat to world peace and that the United 
Nations should no longer ignore the question. On the other hand, those 
who opposed the inclusion of the question, mainly the western powers 
and the majority of the Latin American states, considered the problem as
171"purely a matter of internal jurisdiction."
The representative of France charged that the inclusion of the
question in the agenda would endanger the future of the United Nations,
because it would give this organization the right to interfere whenever a
racial, religious or linguistic minority existed within the boundaries
of a certain country. Then he asked what was expected to be achieved
through this debate? "Freedom for the Moslem populations of Algeria?
But were they not already free? Did they net already enjoy universal
suffrage? Were they not already represented in the Algerian Assembly,
as in all the national assemblies? Moslems had the same rights as
172other French citizens," he added.
The representative of the United States argued that the Algerian 
question fell within the provisions of Article 2, (7), of the United 
Nations Charter, vdiich prohibited United Nations interference in 
domestic questions. He warned the General Assembly of the danger to 
the future of the United Nations in taking up questions whose consider­
ation would conflict with the provision of this Article. The position
"Question of Algeria Inscribed on Agenda," United Nations 
Reviews, (New York; United Nations Department of Public Information), 
II, (November 1955)» 65.
]-7̂ Ibid.
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of the United Kingdom, Colombia, Norway and the Netherlands was 
essentially the same as that of France and the United States.̂ "̂ ^
The majority of the Afro-Asian states and the Soviet bloc supported 
the inscription of the question on the agenda and claimed that the dis­
cussion of the question could not be considered as an intervention 
within the meaning of Article 2, (7), of the Charter. They did not 
believe that Algeria was intergral part of France, and they declared 
that the Algerian Arab did not enjoy all rights of French citizenship. 
They declared that the;
Algerians were discriminated against in the distribution of 
seats in Algerian Councils and the local bodies. The two- 
college electoral system and the equal numbers of seats reserved 
for Algerians and Frenchmen in those bodies— although the 
Algerians outnumbered the French residents of Algeria ten 
to one— sufficed to prove the unequal treatment. In the 
French National Assembly, consisting of 60 deputies, more than 
nine million Algerian Arabs were represented by only I5 Arab 
deputies, and by seven senators out of 319 in the Council 
of the Republic. If the Algerian "départements" were dealt 
with as PVench metropolitan "départements," they should be 
allowed to send 125 or I30 deputies to the National Assembly 
and a proportionate number of senators to the Council of 
the Republic. The facts were that Algeria was not represented 
"on the same basis" as were the various parts of Metropolitan 
France, and it was governed as a colony.
The recommendation of the General Committee to the General Assembly 
not to include the Algerian question on the agenda was rejected by the 
latter on 30 September 1955, and therefore, the question was included. 
After the inclusion of the question on the agenda, the representative 
of France stated that in the matter of internal jurisdiction of his 
country, his Government refused to accept any intervention of the
'̂̂ 3lbid., 66.
^^^earbook of the United Nations, 1955» 66-67.
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General Assembly which would conflict with the provisions of the Charter 
and would regard as null and void any recommendation of the General 
Assembly on the matter. Believing that the vote which was taken might 
influence the relations between France and the United Nations, the 
French representative and his delegation thenceforth ceased to attend 
the meetings of the General Assembly and of all its standing Committees. 
The discussion on the question was postponed until 25 November 1955-̂ '̂  ̂
When the General Assembly reconsidered the question on 25 November, 
it quickly adopted a proposal which was made by the Political Committee 
without objection or debate.. The unanimous decision was taken because 
the members of the General Assembly believed that no proper solution 
could be found without the presence of the French delegation. The text 
of the resolution read as follows:
The General Assembly,
Decides not to consider further the item entitled "The question of 
Algeria"arid is therefore no longer seized of this s e s s i o n ,^78
Many representatives, including several Arab states, expressed regret
over the absence of the French delegation from the Assembly's debates,
and they expressed the hope that the Algerian problem would be solved in
a peaceful manner. On 29 November, the French delegation returned to
the General Assembly.
2. The Problem in the Eleventh Session; The situation in Algeria had 
deteriorated so badly during the autumn of 1956 that it became even more 
difficult for the General Assembly to deal with the question successfully.
175lbid., 67.
^76q .r .g.a ., Tenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 548th Meeting, (25 
November 195j ) , 371.
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On 22 October 1956, shortly before the Assembly’s eleventh session, a 
Moroccan plane transporting five of the most important leaders of the 
Algerian nationalists to their headquarters was diverted by its French 
crew to Algiers where the Algerians were arrested by the French.
From Tunisian and Moroccan sources it was understood that the five 
leaders were engaged in secret official talks with the French on the 
Algerian crisis, and irjlth officials from Tunisia and Morocco on the 
possibility of their serving as mediators. The arrest of the Algerian 
leaders was denounced by Morocco as "an act of piracy, violation of 
intemaüonaL law,; and personal insult to the Sultan of Morocco whose 
guests they were at the time of their a r r e s t . ^^8
On 2 October 1956, fifteen Afro-Asian states requested the 
inclusion of the Algerian question on the agenda of the eleventh session 
of the General Assembly. The letter stated that the situation had 
worsened since the postponement of the discussion in the General 
Assembly in its tenth session. Because France had continued its policy 
of military repression and had increased its forces from 150,000 to 
over 450,000 these states declared that the situation in Algeria was
179likely to endanger international peace and security.
On 15 November 1956, the General Assembly decided at its 578th 
meeting to include the Algerian question on its agenda. The French
^^^Ann Winslow, Editor-in-Chief, "Issues Before the Ti-relfth 
General Assembly— Algeria, " International Conciliation, (September 
1957). No.514. 59.
^7Qlbid.
^79q.r.g.A., Eleventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 62, Document 
A/3197, (2 October 1956), 1.
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delegation did not object to the inclusion of the q u e s t i o n . T h e
French Foreign Minister declared that the French Government had not
changed its opinion about the Algerian question as a domestic affair.
France did not object to the inclusion of the Algerian question on the
agenda because she wished to make a public reply to the campaigns of
systematic denigration which had been directed against her for several
years. France also wished to raise the question of foreign interference
in Algeria. Mr. Pineau of France charged that the problem would have
been solved if certain Powers had not kept the conflict alive by their
deliveries of arms and an "astonishing orgy of propaganda.
France declared that she was unable to accept any recommendation
from the General Assembly, beduàse such an interference would be in
violations of Article two, (7), of the Charter of the United Nations.
The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy and several other
western states supported the French position. They argued that the
United Nations was not competent to deal with the question and that
many countries would never have agreed to join the United Nations if
Article two, (7), of the Charter had not precluded intervention in
182matters essentially of domestic nature.
On the other hand many Afro-Asian countries plus Greece reasoned 
that the United Nations was competent to deal with the Algerî '' 
question, because it did not fall exclusively within the domestic
^̂ *̂ Ibid. ■ Plenary Meetings, 578th Meeting, (15 November 1956),
39-40.
-I On
O.R.G.A., Eleventh Session, First Committee, 830th Meeting, 
(4 February 1957), 99.
^^^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, 118.
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jurisdiction of France. They believed that Algeria was never integrated 
into France either in fact or law. VJhat ever political or constitu­
tional devises used by France to justify the incorporation of Algeria,
■] O oshe was not a part of a genuine union, they added.
Although the Algerian nationalists were unable to present their 
views to the United Nations, their position was very clear to the United 
Nations' delegations. The nationalists insisted that France should 
recognize the Algerian independence unconditionally prior to a cease­
fire agreement. She also should recognize the Algerian provisional 
government and release a U  political prisoner s.
a. The problem in the Political Committee; The question of Algeria
was considered by the Political Committee of the General Assembly at its
830th through its 848th meetings. Eighteen Afro-Asian countries gave
their opinion on the question on 5 February 1957. in a draft resolution.
which expressed concern about the grave situation in Algeria which was
causing much human suffering. They recognized the right of the Algerian
people to self-determination and requested the French Government to
respond to the wish of the Algerians to exercise their fundamental
right of self-determination. The eighteen states invited both parties
to enter into negotiations immediately and cease hostilities. They also
requested the Secretary General to help the parties conduct the negotia-
18-5tions and report to the General Assembly at its twelfth session.
^G3%bid.
^®\rinslow, Loc. cit., 60.
1®5o .R.G.A., Eleventh,Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 62, Document 
A/G.l/L. 165, (5 February 1957), 2:
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A second resolution was introduced at the 843rd meeting on 11 
February 1957 by Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. This resolution 
considered the grave situation in Algeria, and declared that the 
unsatisfactory situation could be normalized by the joint efforts of 
the French and the Algerian people to reach a better understanding and 
a solution in accordance i-rith the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.̂ ^̂
The representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Domincan 
Republic, Italy, and Peru introduced a third draft resolution on 12 
February. They simply expressed the hope for a peaceful and democratic 
solution for the Algerian p r o b l e m . ^^7
On 13 February 1957» a vote was taken on the three draft resolu­
tions. The Political Committee voted on the eighteen-powers resolution 
paragraph by paragraph. The first operative paragraph was rejected by 
a vote of 33 in favor, 34 against with 10 abstentions.^®^ The second
^®^Ibid., Document A/C.1/L. I66, (11 February 1957)» 3»
^®7lbid., Document A/C.1/L. I67, (12 February 1957). 3-
ISSfn favor; Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Nbrocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against ; Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Domincan Republic, 
Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxem­
bourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norvxay, Panama, Peru, 
Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, United States, 
Uruguey, Venzuela.
Abstaining : Bolivia, Cambodia, EL Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia,
Mexico, Paraguay, Phillippines, Spain, Thialand.
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operative paragraph was rejected by a vote of 33 in favor, 34 against
I'lith 9 abstentions. The Afro-Asian bloc, Greece, and the Soviet bloc
voted in its favor; the Western Powers and the majority of the Latin
American states voted against it. The Committee, because of the
rejection of the first two operative paragraphs, did not take a vote on
the rest of the draft resolution. Therefore, the draft resolution as a
whole was rejected. And the three-power resolution and the six-power
189resolution were adopted.
b. The problem in the General Assembly; The General Assembly considered 
the two resolutions which were recommended by the Political Committee, 
Before the General Assembly there was also another draft resolution 
sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Domincan Republic, Italy, 
Japan, Peru, Philippines, and Thailand. The President of the General 
Assembly stated that the new nine-power draft resolution (the text is 
below) was considered as a conciliatory move made by the sponsors of 
the six-power and the three-power draft resolutions which were adopted 
by the Committee. The General Assembly voted and adopted the new draft 
resolution unanimously. This resolution was the final action taken by 
the General Assembly in its eleventh session. The text of the resolu­
tion was as follows:
The General Assembly,
Having heard the statements made by various delegations and 
discussed the question of Algeria,
Having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing 
much suffering and loss of human lives,
Express the hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a
^^^O.R.G.A., Eleventh Session, First Committee, 846th Meeting, 
(13 February 1957), 206-212.
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peaceful, democratic and just solution id_ll be found, through 
appropriate means, in conformity with principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.^90
3. The Problem in the Tvrelfth Session; On 16 July 1957, the represent­
atives of twenty-two Afro-Asian countries requested in a letter to the 
Secretary General that the question of Algeria should be included on 
the agenda of the General Assembly's twelfth session. In an explanatory 
memorandum, they recalled the resolution which was adopted unanimously 
by the General Assembly in the eleventh session. They declared that 
since the adoption of the resolution there had been no indication to 
the United Nations from its member States that any improvement had been 
made. It further stated that the suffering and loss of human life in 
Algeria continued and increased. There were many delegates to the 
United Nations who criticised the French action in Malouga Kasbuh, 
where the males of that village were lined up and shot. Since the 
resolution of the previous year did not show any progress toward a 
peaceful settlement it was necessary that the question of Algeria 
should be included on the agenda of the twelfth s e s s i o n . T h e  
General Assembly decided to include the Algerian question on its agenda, 
on 20 September 1957*^^^
a. the problem in the Political Committee; The problem of Algeria was 
considered by the Political Committee from its 913th through 926th 
meetings. The French representative explained that his Government did not
^^^Ibid., Annexes, Agenda Item 62, Document A/Res/463, (15 
February 1957), 5*
^^^O.R.G.A., Twelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 59, Document 
A/3617, (18 July 1957), 1-2.
^92Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, 68.
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object to the placing of the Algerian question on the Assembly's agenda 
but that this must not be interpreted as a change in the French position 
on the competence of the United Nations intervention. France partici­
pated in the debate in order to show the efforts which were being i.iade 
to bring about a peaceful settlement and to refute the calumnies 
directed against her.^^^
The French representative explained his government's policy in 
Algeria, which rested upon three pillars : cease-fire, election, and 
negotiations. He stated that after the cease-fire had taken place a 
single electoral college would be elected in order to enable the 
Algerian population to choose freely their representatives. As soon as 
the elected Algerian assemblies had been organized, negotiations would 
begin in order to establish the permenent institutions of Algeria which 
would allow full exercise of individual rights and freedoms. France 
also informed the United Nations that the Parliament was debating a 
basic law (loi-cadre ) which would be used as an instrument for achieving 
the French policy in Algeria.
The French representative noted that President Habib Bourgaiba of 
Tunisia and King Mohammed V of Morocco "placed their good offices at
the disposal of France and the authorities of the /Algeria^ Front
195National Liberation." But France rejected the offer because both
9̂3ibid.
^9^0.R.G.A., T\ielfth Session, First Committee, 913th Meeting,
(27 November 1957). 253.
Ann Winslow, Editor-in-Chief, "Issues Before the Thirteenth 
General Assembly— Algeria," International Conciliation, (September 1958), 
No.519, 38.
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countries were under pressure of the FLN idalch threatened their 
sovereignty and, were not sufficiently free to determine their ovm 
attitude toward the rebels.^^^
Several states supported the French position and argued that the 
United Nations did not have the right to intervene. Among those who 
took this position were Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Israel, the Nether­
lands, Peru, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, 
several other countries declared that the United Nations was competent 
to deal with the Algerian question. They pointed out that the French 
rule in Algeria originally had been installed by military intervention 
and its present character should be considered only as a colonial 
occupation maintained without regard for the x-rlshes of the people of 
Algeria. Moreover, since the war in Algeria endangered the peace and 
security in the area, it was both the duty and the right of the United 
Nations to continue its efforts for a peaceful solution. Furthermore, 
this problem was prejudicial to good relations between France on one 
side and Tunisia and Morocco on the other. They invoked Article four­
teen of the Charter of the United Nations, under which the General 
Assembly might recommend measures for improving any situation regardless 
of origin, which it deemed likely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations. Among those who took this position
were the representatives of the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, Albania,
197Ukraine, Uruguay, Guatemala, and many Afro-Asian states.
^96q ,r .G.A., Twelfth Session, First Committee, 913th Meeting,
(27 Nov#ber 1957), 256.
Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957» 70*
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Tirro draft resolutions were introduced in the Political Comiittee. 
The first, sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian countries, recognized the 
applicability of the principle of self-determination to the Aglerian 
people and called for negotiations in order to settle the problem in 
accordance with the principles of the C h a r t e r . T h e  second draft 
resolution was introduced by the following seven powers: Argentina,
Brazil, Cuba, the Domincan Republic, Italy, Peru, and Spain. They 
simply took note of the attempts to solve the problem through the offer 
of good offices of Heads of States and by the French legislature's 
measures. They also expressed the hope, once again, that a peaceful and 
just solution would be found through appropriate means in conformity 
with the principles of the C h a r t e r .^^9
The seventeen-power draft resolution was rejected by the Political 
Committee, by a vote of 37 in favor, 37 against and with 6 abstentions. 
The voting pattern was essentially the same as in the previous session. 
The Argentinian representative, on behalf of the other states which 
jointly sponsored the second draft resolution, declared that the 
sponsors of the resolution would not press that draft resolution to a 
vote, but wanted to reserve the right to submit it in the plenary 
meeting of the General Assembly. The Political Committee, therefore, 
did not recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of any résolu-
1980.R.G.A., Twelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 59, Document 
A/C.l/L. 19C"l7 December 1957), 2.
^^^Ibid., Document A/C.l/L. 195«
200q .R.G.A., Ttrelfth Session, 1st Committee, 925th Meeting, ( 
December 1957),3^2.
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b. The probien in the General Assembly: On 10 December 1957, the
General Assembly at its 726th plenary meeting, by a vote of 80 to none, 
adopted a draft resolution. The draft resolution was sponsored by the 
following fifteen states; Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, the Domincan 
Republic, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru,
Spain and Thialand. The text of the resolution was as follows:
The General Assembly.
Having discussed the question of Algeria,
Recalling its resolution 1012 (XI) of 15 February 1957,
1. Expresses again its concern over the situation in Algeria;
2. Takes note of the offer of good offices made by His îajesty 
the King of Morocco and His Excellency the President of the 
Republic of Tunisia;
3* Expresses the wish that, in a spirit of effective co­
operation, pourparlers vri.ll be entered into, and other 
appropriate means utilized, with a view to a solution, in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.
This resolution was adopted as a conciliatory measure. Hoifever, 
the Tunisian representative and certain other delegates of Arab states 
objected to the resolution as a compromise, partly because it did not 
include the right of self-determination to the Algerian people, and 
partly because the compromise failed to mention who will conduct the 
pourparlers.
The General Assembly adopted such a vague ard elastic resolution 
for several reasions: 1. France insisted that the Algerian problem was
outside the United Nations jurisdiction and she would regard any 
recommendation by the United Nations on this matter as null and void;
^^^O.R. G.A., TirJelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 59, Document 
1184 (m), (10 December 1957), 3.
^^^New York Times (11 December 1957), 1*
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2. Any stronger resolution would not coramand the two-thiids niajority 
required for the passage of any resolution; 3. The majority of the 
General Assembly believed that the new French legislation (loi-cadre) 
might assist the parties to solve their problem; 4. They also believed 
that a stronger resolution by the United Nations might impair any 
possibility of negotiations between the parties outside the United 
Nations and might alienate the French delegation.
4. The Problem in the Thirteenth Session
a. In the Security Council; The fighting in Algeria continued and, if 
anything, quickened its pace, particularly along border areas. The 
French Government declared that the nationalists received arms and 
asylum from their neighbors, especially Tunisia and Egypt and believed 
that the rebels could not subsist without such outside aid. It claimed 
and exercised a "right of pursuit" of Algerian nationalists into 
Tunisian territory and tried to seal the borders.^^^
Many border fights took place, and on 8 February 1958» these 
incidents developed into a serious international crisis when twenty- 
five French planes bombed the Tunisian border town Sakiet-Sidi Tusif. 
This was believed to be a center of Algerian nationalist activities. 
Immediately after the bombing both France and Tunisia sent complaints 
to the Security Council; the former complained about the Tunisian aid 
to the nationalists, and the latter charged French aggression.
*̂̂ Ânn Winslow, Editor-in-Chief, "Issues Before the Thirteenth 
General Assembly," International Cone illation, (September 1958)» No.519. 
41.
^Q^O.R.S.C.. Thirteenth Year, 811th Meeting, Documents s/3952 
13 February 1958, and S/395^ 14 Feburary 1958, 2.
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On 18 February 1958, the Security Council included the French- 
Tunisian problem on its agenda of 811th meeting. After both the 
Tunisian and the French representatives presented their views on the 
problem, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom 
offered their good offices to assist the parties in settling their 
dispute. The offer was accepted by both parties. The representative 
of Sweden proposed and the Council agreed to adjourn to allow the 
parties to negotiate wiili the assistance of the Commission of Good
Offices.205
In the meantime, Tunisia took direct action on its territory by 
virtually blockading 22,000 French troops in their barracks. The 
conflict was intensified by sporadic fighting between the confined 
French troops and the Tunisian Army. One of these fights near Ramada 
was so serious that complaints were again sent to the Security Council 
on 29 May 1958.206
On 2 June 1958, the Security Council met to discuss French- 
Tunisian complaints. After the Council included the question in its 
agenda, Tunisia charged France with act of aggression. France denied 
the Tunisian charge, and complained about Tunisian assistance to the 
Algerian rebels. Later, at the same meeting, France proposed a two- 
week postponement of the discussion to allow negotiations between the 
two countries. The Tunisian delegations accepted the proposal.
20j&htemational Organization; Summary of Activities of the 
United Nations Security Council— Tunisian Question," International 
Organization. XII, (Summer 1958), 338.
^^^Winslow, Loc. cit.
207International Organization. Loc. cit., 40.
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On 18 June 19^8, France informed the Security Council that a 
settlement had been concluded between the two countries. France agreed 
to evacuate its troops within four months from all Tunisian territory 
with the exception of Bizerte. The Tunisian Government agreed to 
restore freedom of movement to French forces. The President of the 
Security Council congratulated the two countries for solving their 
problem through direct negotiations.
b. in the General Assembly; On 16 July 1958, twenty-four Afro-Asian
countries asked the General Assembly once again to put the Algerian
question on its agenda of the thirteenth session. They declared that
since the adoption of the final resolution of the General Assembly's
tw^tii session, the hostilities had continued in that area, causing
increasing suffering and loss of human life, and that settlement in
209conformity with the principles of the Charter was not in sight.
On 17 September 1958, France declared in the Assembly's General
Committee that it continued to believe that the inclusion of the
Algerian question conflicted with the meaning of Article two (?), of the
Charter, France also believed that the question had been sufficiently
aired and therefore did not deem it necessary to participate in the
debate if the question were included on the agenda. However, the
General Assembly without discussion decided to include the question on
210its agenda of the thirteenth session, on 22 September 1958.
208Ibid.. 40J^1.
G.A., Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 63, 
Document 3855, (16 July 1958), 1-2.
^^^O.R.G.A., Thirteentli Session Plenary Meetings, 752nd Meeting, 
(22 September 1958), 50.
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l)the problem in the Political Committee: The question of Algeria was
discussed by the Political Committee from its 1014th to 1023rd meetings, 
which were held between 8 and 13 December 1959. The events in this 
session did not differ greatly from the previous sessions. Tvro basic 
positions emerged during the discussion. The Western Powers and many 
Latin American countries maintained that the United Nations was not 
competent to deal with the question because it was of a domestic nature. 
The Afro-Asian states and the Soviet bloc declared that as long as the 
military operation extended beyond Algeria, it could not be claimed 
that the Algerian problem fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
France. These countries believed that the United Nations was competent 
to deal with the question and that it should take a positive position 
in this matter.
The representative of Tunisia regretted that France had decided 
not to participate in the debate. He also regretted his inability to 
report to the Committee that his Government and the Government of 
Morocco had carried out their mission of Good Offices, since France 
rejected the offer. Moreover, he referred to the establishment of the 
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic which took place on 
19 September 1958. This Government had stated its willingness to 
negotiate with France, and had declared that all guarantees compatible 
with the Algerian sovereignty would be provided for French interests in
^^"International Organization: Summary of Activities of the 
United Nations General Assembly— The Algerian Question," International 
Organization, XIII, (Winter 1959), 80-81.
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in Algeria, the Tunisian representative added.
At the 1020th meeting of the Political CoiEiittee a draft resolu­
tion was submitted by the delegation of seventeen Afro-Asian powers, 
the main paragraphs of which read as follows :
The General Assembly,
Recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence. 
Deeply concerned t/ith the continuance of the war in Algeria, 
Considering that the present situation in Algeria constitute 
a threat to international peace and security,
Taking note of the -willingness of the Pro-̂ /isional GoverniTieât 
of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations tfibh the 
Government of France.
Urges negotiations between the two parties concerned with 
a view to reaching a solution in conformity ■'.•lith the Charter 
of the United Nations.^13
An amendraent to "Ihis resolution was submitted by Haiti. This
amendment proposed that the seventh paragraph, which began -with, "Taking
note of the tJillingness of the Provisional Government ...," should be
replaced by the following text;
Taking note that both the French Government and the Algerian 
leaders of the liberation movement have affirmed their wish 
to enter into negotiations.
It was undeniable, the representative of Haiti stated, that the 
French Government had offered to open negotiations xrith the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic. The mere fact that the terms of 
the French offer had not been accepted by the Algerian leaders, did not 
mean that French Government refused to negotia-te. Therefore,
212o.r,g.A., Thirteenth Session, 1st Committee, 1014th Meeting,
(9 December 19^8), 338-339.
^^3o.r.g.A., Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 63. Document 
A/C.I./l. 232, (13 December 1958), 2.
^^^O.R.G.A., Thirteenth Session, 1st Committee, 1022nd Meeting,
(13 December 1958), 376.
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the United Nations should also take note of the French Governiient's 
tri-llingness to negotiate. He also proposed a change of iTording, nnnely 
the replacement of the words "Provisional Government of the Algerian 
Republic '• by "the Algerian leaders of the liberation movement. " He 
regretted the fact that his Government had not recognized the Pro­
visional Government. As a consequence his delegation was faced with 
juridical problems which prevented them from voting in favor of the 
draft resolution as it stood. After the general debate on the amendment 
took place, the delegation of Haiti, believing that their proposal 
would not receive enough votes for passage, did not press it to a
vote.2’5
The seventeen-powers draft resolution was adopted in the Political 
Committee, by a vote of 32 in favor and 18 against with 30 abstentions^^^ 
and was recommended to the General Assembly.^
^^^Ibid.
216The voting pattern was as follows:
In favor: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslavakia, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea,, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic,
United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against ; Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Domini­
can Republic, Israel, Italy, Laos, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Portugal, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States.
Abstaining ; Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, EL Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, 
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, 
Non-Jay, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Svjeden, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venzuala.
^̂ '̂ O.R.G.A., Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 63, Document 
A/4073, (13 December 1958), 3.
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2) the General Assembly failed to adopt any draft resolution; Following 
the presentation of the report of the Political Committee, the repre­
sentative of Malaya also proposed to delete the seventh paragraph of 
the proposed resolution which reads as follows:
Taking note of the willingness of the Provisional Government 
of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations ihLth 
the Government of France.
He declared that the deletion of that paragraph would enable his dele­
gation and other like-minded delegations which abstained from voting on 
the draft resolution as a whole because of this paragraph to vote in 
favor of the draft resolution.
The General Assembly adopted the Malayan proposal by a roll-call 
vote of 38 in favor to none, with 4-3 abstentions.After the deletion 
of paragraph seven the General Assembly voted on the draft resolution 
as a whole. It received 35 votes in favor, 18 against ;m.th 28 absten­
tions. Thus, the Assembly was not able to adopt the resolution, since
^^^O.R.G.A., Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meeting, 792nd Meeting, 
(13 December 1958), 622-623.
^In favor : Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thialand, Tunisia, Union of South 
Africa, United States, Uruguay,, Venzela, Yemen, Austria, Brazil, Burma, 
Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EL Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya,Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Ireland, Japan.
Abstaining ; Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg. Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkpy, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, 
United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Finalnd, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, 
Jordan.
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it failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.
5. The Problem in the Fourteenth Session: Twenty-five Afro-Asian
countries requested the General Assembly to include the Algerian
question on its agenda for the fifth time, char^g that there was no
indication of improvement in the Algerian situation. The General
Assembly agreed to include the question on its agenda.
In a radio speech, on 16 September 1959, President de Gaulle of
France recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination
and the nationalists reacted favorably. As a result, the Assembly’s
discussion on the Algerian question in this session took place against
a more hopeful background than at any time since the beginning of the
Algerians' revolution in November 195^. Before this proclamation,
there was an unbridgeable gulf between the determination of France to
keep Algeria closely tied to it and the nationalist insistance of the
221recognition of Algeria's independence. The focus of the disagree­
ment now narrowed to the nature and the extent of the guarantees in
order that self-determination might truly reflect the wish of the 
Algerian people. Nevertheless, the %far in Algeria continued and a 
Triide gap still existed between the opinions of the two parties.
a. in the Political Committee*. The Political Committee considered the 
item on its 106?th to 1078th meetings, inclusive. As before, the 
French delegation did not participate in this debate, for it felt that 
the question was sufficiently aired and that it conflicted vri-th the
^^%.R.G.A., Loc. cit.
PP1Ann Winslow, Editor-in-Chief, "Issues Before the Fifteenth 
General Assembly— Algeria, " International Conciliation, (September I960), 
No.529, 48-49.
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meaning of Article two (?), of the Charter of the United Nations.
Tvro basic opinions on this question were expressed during the
debate in the Political Committee. The Western Powers and many Latin
American countries felt that the Committee must not adopt any resolution
on the Algerian question. Such action would delay the implementation
of President de Gaulle's proposal and would not improve its terms.
Many of the Afro-Asian states and the Soviet bloc maintained that it
was up to the Assembly to encourage the two parties to enter into
negotiations through a resolution with a view toward achieving an early
222end to the hostilities.
Burma submitted a draft resolution to the Political Committee at 
its 1070th meeting. The operative paragraph of the resolution was as 
follows :
The General Assembly.
Urges the two parties concerned to enter into pourparlers 
^iscussion^ to determine the conditions necessary for the 
implementation as early as possible of the right of self- 
determination of the Algerian people, including conditions 
for a cease-fire.
On 7 December.1959» the resolution was approved by the Political 
Committee of the General Assembly by a vote of 38 in favor, 26 against 
with 17 abstentions. The majority of the Afro-Asian states and the 
Soviet bloc voted in favor of the resolution. The Western Powers, 
including the United States and the United Kingdom, and the majority of
"International Organization: Summary of Activities of the United 
Nations General Assembly— Algeria," Intemational Organization, XIV, 
(Winter I96O), 120-121.
223See appendix B, the fourth resolution, 135*
^^^ew York Times, (8 December 1939), 3»
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the Latin American countries voted against it. The French delegation 
was still absent.^^5
b. in the General Assembly: The General Assembly, in this session,
took no action icith regard to the controversial question of Algeria. It 
rejected a resolution submitted by Pakistan, by a vote of 39 in favor,
22 against vjith 29 abstentions. The main points of this resolution 
were: first, that the Assembly recognize the right of the Algerians to 
self-determination; second, that the Assembly urge the parties to 
undertake informal talks, % t h  a view to arriving at a peaceful solu­
tion on the basis of the right of self-determination in accordance vrith 
the principle of the Charter of the United Hâtions
The Western Powers maintained the same position which they took in 
the Political Committee, preferring that no move should be made by the 
Assembly. While the United States abstained from voting, Britain and 
Belgium boüi voted against the resolution; they claimed that the 
adoption of any resolution by the Assembly might impede talks between
France and the Algerian people^^^ The Pakistanian resolution received
228solid support from the Soviet bloc.
Voting on this resolution took an unusual pattern. Every indi­
vidual paragraph of the resolution was adopted separately. But idien 
the Assembly voted on the resolution as a whole, it failed to receive
^^^O.R.G.A., Fourteenth Session, 1st Committee, 1076th Meeting, 
(7 December 1959), 277.
^^^New York Times, (13 December 1959), ^5*
^ 7 lbid.
228ibid., (8 December 1959), 3*
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the two-thirds majority required for passage.
^^^xbid,, (13 December 1959), 5̂.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION
What is the significacs of the Algerian problem in international 
relations? Was the problem an international or domestic issue? Miat 
was the role of the United Nations in its attempt to settle the Algerian 
problem? Why did the United Nations not take a stronger action? Why 
was the Algerian problem not settled in these six years? What was the 
position of the super-powers? What are the possibilities for change in 
those factors which thus far have prevented settlement of the Algerian 
problem?
A. What is the Significance of the Algerian Problem in International 
Relations? Was the Problem an International or Domestic Issue
The Algerian question is one of the most complicated and important 
contemporary problems. It does not involve France and the Algerians 
alone, but it has caused a deterioration., in the relationship of France 
viith Arab countries in particular, and also with the Afro -Asian states. 
The problem is dangerous to NATO as long as some of the French troops 
are withdrawn from Western Germany to fight the Algerian nationalists, 
disregarding the objection of some NATO powers who oppose breaking up 
the unified defense forces of the Western allies in that area. Presi­
dent John Kennedy, has stated his belief that "prompt settlement /pf 
the Algerian problem was/" an urgent necessity— for North Africa, for 
France, for the United States, NATO, and the Western W o r l d .
Algeria : Most Serious Threat of All, " Newsxfeek, LVI, (28 
November I960), 32.
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Furthermore, considering the grave problem of combatting communism, 
the free world cannot afford to lose either France or Algeria to the 
Communist bloc. The revolution in Algeria is pushing the nationalist 
closer to the Eastern Gamp. Both Red China and the Soviet Union are 
supporting the Algerians. And if the red volunteers (troops)^31 should 
come to the Algerians* assistance in fighting the French, a major world 
crises would be at hand.
In addition, the west needs to unify its forces to meet the com­
munist threat. But the Algerian problem is helping to disunite the free 
world. France has not been satisfied with the position of the United 
States with regard to the Algerian problem. The French, have claimed 
that the United States has not taken a strong enough action. The United 
States abstained from voting in the fourteenth session of the General 
Assembly, on the Afro-Asian resolution, while the French expected her 
to vote against such a resolution. France also has expected greater 
support in arms and money from the United States.
The Afro -Asian states have not been satisfied with the position 
which the United States has taken on the Algerian problem. The United 
States supported the French position in the United Nations, by declaring 
the Algerian problem to be a French internal affair and that the United 
Nations should not deal with it.
Moreover, in 1956 the United States Ambassador to France, Douglas 
Dillon, declared that his Government gave its "whole-hearted support" 
to the French in solving its problem in North Africa. This statement
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made the Arab people disappointed in the United States as a freedom 
loving nation. If the United States loves freedom, the Arabs believe, 
she should assist other areas in the world to have it too.̂ 32
All these points show the significance of the Algerian problem in 
international relations and lead one to believe that the problem was an 
international issue and did not lie exclusively within the French 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the United Nations has the right and the duty 
to intervene in order to assist in finding a suitable solution for the 
problem.
B. What was the Role of the United Nations in its Attempt to Settle 
the Algerian Problem
1. The Problem in the Security Council: The Algerian problem was
brought to the Security Council as well as to the General Assembly upon
the request of many Afro-Asian countries.
In April 1956, sixteen Afro-Asian states requested the Security
Council to include the Algerian question on its agenda, on the ground
that it was a potential danger to international peace and tranquility.
The Security Council discussed the inclusion of the question on
its agenda on 26 June 1956. France invoked Article 2, (7), of the
Charter of the United Nations, claiming that the question was a domestic
problem which the United Nations Charter did not give the Security
Council the authority to discuss. The United Kingdom, Cuba, and
Belgium supported this view. The United States, Peru, and China
believed that the discussion at this time would not achieve any
H. el-Farra, "Aspirations of the People of French North 
Africa," Annals; American Acadamey of Political and Social Science, 
No.306, (July 1959). 14.
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practical results.
When the proposal of the inclusion was put to a vote, only Iran 
and the Soviet Union voted in favor of inclusion. Yugoslavia and China 
abstained, and the other seven members of the Security Council voted in 
the negative. The Algerian question was never included on the agenda 
of the Security Council, although the Tunisian question which was 
related to the Algerian problem was included in the agenda of the 
Security Council in 1958.^^^
2. The Problem in the General Assembly; Although the Algerian question 
had received more detailed consideration in the General Assembly than 
it did in the Security Council, as it had been included on the General 
Assembly's agenda six times, no resolution of real importance has been 
passed. Before every session of the General Assembly since the tenth 
session an ever increasing number of Afro-Asian states have brought the 
grave situation in Algeria to the attention of the United Nations, 
claiming that the situation might endanger world peace and security 
and that there had been no progress in the previous year.
In each of these sessions of the General Assembly two basic views 
have been expressed. The majority of the Western states and several 
Latin American countries supported the French position. They charged 
that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the question 
because it was a French domestic problem and Article ^(7). of the 
Charter was applicable.
A different position was taken by a large majority of the Afro- 
Asian countries, the Communists bloc, plus a few Latin American states.
233see 93-94.
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These powers charged that Article 2, (7), of the Charter was not applic­
able here. They denied French sovereignty over Algeria and claimed 
that since there were other countries involved in the question, and 
because the problem had caused deterioration of the relationship between 
France and other countries, the United Nations was competent to inter­
vene under Article fourteen of the Charter.^3^ They declared that the 
United Nations should take decisive action to solve the problem.
C. What was the Action of the United Nations
Although the Algerian question was put on the agenda of the 
General Assembly's tenth session, its discussion was discontinued by 
the Assembly. It was believed that no proper solution could be found 
without the participation of France, who boycotted the debate.
During the five successive sessions in which the Algerian question 
was included on the General Assembly's agenda, only two resolutions 
were passed. The General Assembly at its eleventh session adopted a 
resolution which simply expressed the hope that a peaceful, democratic, 
and just solution would be found in conformity with the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations.
The General Assembly adopted another resolution at its twelfth 
session. In this resolution the General Assembly, once again, expressed 
its hope for a peaceful settlement in conformity with the purposes and 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also noted the 
offer of good offices made by the King of Morocco and the President of
^Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations states:
...the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjust­
ment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations ...
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Tunisia.
The General Assembly failed to adopt any resolution at its 
thirtenth and the fourteenth sessions, partly because of the insistence 
of the French delegation that the question was outside the jurisdictions 
of the United Nations, and partly because the majority of the members 
were afriad that a strong resolution might jeopardize any possibility 
for settlement which was taking place outside the United Nations.
During the past six years of war in Algeria the United Nations had not 
been successful even in issuing a cease-hostilities order, in requesting 
the parties to enter into negotiations, nor in offering its good 
offices. The discussion of the Algerian question in the United Nations 
during the past five sessions helped its members to have a better under­
standing of the problem; this might enable the United Nations to assist
in settling the problem in the future.
D. Why Did the United Nations Not Take Stronger Action
There were three major factors which made it very difficult for 
the United Nations to act in order to find a suitable solution for the 
Algerian problem. First, the super powers were in disagreement over 
the position witch the United Nations should take on the question. The 
Soviet Union and its satellites backed Algerian independence and 
requested the United Nations to recognize the right of self- 
determination for the Algerian people and to ask the French to negotiate 
with the FLN before proclaiming cease-fire. But the United States and 
the United Kingdom declared that the United Nations should not take any 
action in the matter, because they considered Algeria as a part of 
France and Article 2, (7), of the Charter of the United Nations was
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applicable.
Second, Prance was a permanent member in the Security Council 
xd.th the veto power. Any decision which the Security Council made 
could not be enforced as long as France was able to veto it. This 
factor might have affected the position of some Security Council 
members who desired to discuss the question in the Security Council. 
They knew that such discussion would be of no substantial benefit and 
might alienate France.
Third, it was difficult to find a solution in the United Nations 
as long as France boycotted the discussion of the Algerian question.
E. VJhy Was Not the Problem Settled During the Past Six Years
If the United Nations was unable to take decisive action to 
settle the problem, France and the FLN were the main parties to do so. 
But there were many forces within France herself working against a 
suitable solution. First, there was a prevailing sentiment within the 
professional officer core of the French Army against negotiation with 
the FLN, and against any solution to the problem which would not 
involve the physical surrender of the Algerian rebels. These officers 
were a strong force in French politics.
Second, the European settlers in Algeria had great political 
influence in Algeria and Paris. Ihese settlers were bitterly against 
any change in Algeria which might reduce their power. When these 
forces combined their efforts, the result was a strong power against a 
suitable solution to the problem.
Third, French intellectuals were divided into three main 
groups on this issue. Their views on the Algerian problem ranged
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from outright assistance to the rebels to the defense of the French 
Army views and "French Algeria.
The first of these groups represented the left-wing, but was 
certainly not exclusively communist. This group issued a declaration 
published by 121 teachers, writers, artists and journalists in which 
they declared the right of the French youth to refrain from fighting 
against the Algerian rebels. They argued that such acts of insubordin­
ation were in conformity vd.th the defense of the eternal humanistic 
values of France which transcended obedience to the s t a t e . ^36
The views of the left-wing group had been violently attacked by 
other equally influencial spokesmen for the intellegentsia xdio repre­
sented the moderate position. They accused the left-wing of "adopting 
an illegal and extremist position, risk alienating the great body of 
law-abiding Frenchmen and projecting them by reaction, into the other 
camp— the Right-Wing defenders of war to the bitter end in defense of 
French sovereignty in Algeria.
The declaration of the moderate group, called "Appeal to Opinioni" 
was issued by sixty-seven distinguished educators, teachers’ union 
officials, writers and journalists. In their appeal they discussed the 
possibility of keeping Algeria French against the rise of nationalism 
in North Africa. They accused the Army of "blackmailing" the Government 
with a threat of an uprising to prevent further negotiation for peace.
^ ■̂5Robert Doty, "France Faces a Crisis of Conscience," New York 
Time Magazine, (16 October I960), I?.
^36ibid.. 123.
^37Ibid., 128.
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In their conclusions, which have since been endorsed by several
thousand new supporters, they declared that:
/The inevitable solution/' will either impose itself in 
upheavals, in the worst of conditions, in France and Algeria, 
or it will be obtained by a negotiation without exclusion 
/of any negotiator^ or prior conditions.238
The right-wing formed the third group of the French intelligentsia. 
They challenged the left-wing as "professors of treason,” disagreed 
with the moderate group views on Algeria and supported the record of 
the Armj in Algeria. The right-wing asked for "an all-out war, " in 
Algeria to suppress the revolt.
This division in views on the Algerian problem within the French 
people— the Army and the right-wing, the ^ropean settlers in Algeria, 
the left-wing, and those who took the moderate position— made it very 
hard for the French Government to act efficiently in finding a suitable 
solution.
Mr. Mendes-France, a former premier, believed that General de 
Gaulle cherished no illusions that the Algerian problem could be solved 
only by force, police measures, and repression. He also felt that de 
Gaulle understood the problem better than his predecessors, but whenever 
de Gaulle expressed or implied such views, he came against the ’ultras’, 
whether in the Array or in Paris or in Algeria.
Fifth, "There are exciting horizons of new economic development
^^Ibid.
3̂9ibid.
2^0pierre Mendes-France, "The Crisis of France, 19^5-1959»" 
International Affairs, XXXV, (July 1959)» 290.
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of oil and minerals in Algeria. The people who had, investments in
their economic development form another force which influenced the 
French policy in Algeria. They wanted to protect their- investment.
Aside from these different forces within France witch made a quick 
and a suitable solution difficult, support from the Arab countries and 
the Soviet bloc to the Algerian nationalists encouraged and helped the 
nationalists to prolong the revolution.
F. What Are the Possibilities for a Change
The increase in the Afro-Asian bloc, after the admission of the 
additional sixteen new members in I960, might lead one to believe that 
the General Assembly would be able to pass a stronger resolution than 
the ones which have been pased so far. The General Assembly might be 
able to adopt a resolution which would call upon the parties to resort 
to peaceful negotiations and cease hostilities. Let us assume that 
this resolution would also tender the good offices of the United 
Nations and offer to supervise a plebiscite throughout Algeria to 
determine the wishes of the people. Let us, also, assume that such a 
resolution would be passed by the General Assembly. What kind of 
results could be e:xpected?
From the experience with the Indonesian question, it can be said 
that two main factors aided greatly the United Nations in assisting the 
parties to reach a peaceful settlement: 1. The new Liberal Socialist 
Dutch Government of August 1948, changed the former policy towards 
Indonesia and earnestly desired to co-operate with the United Nations
^^^John F. Kennedy, "The Algerian Crisis," America, XGVII, 
(5 October 1957), 16.
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to end the deadlock; 2, The United Kingdom and the United States as 
well as other powers exerted pressure upon the Netherlands to comply 
with the United Nations resolutions.
Assuming that the proposed resolution was adopted by the United 
Nations, two questions would arise which would have great impact upon 
the success of this resolution. First, would France accept United 
Nations mediation to end the deadlock, if the United Nations offered 
such mediation, or, would France accept a plebiscite in Algeria super­
vised by the United Nations? Second, would the major western powers be 
willing to exert pressure on France to induce her to comply mth the 
assumed United Nations resolution? As an answer to the first question, 
there seem to be many indications that France is not willing to accept 
any United Nations intervention in this matter. And it is extremely 
difficult to predict an answer to the second question. However, 
assuming that the major western powers agreed to exert such pressure on 
France, it is unknown what effect it would have on the French position, 
since France is one of the major western powers.
Judging from the past, the United Nations is not a source of real 
hope in settling the Algerian problem. However, there are other 
factors, which are not influenced by the United Nations, can lead one to 
believe that there may be a basic solution for the Algerian problem in 
the foreseeable future.
First, the long Algerian resistance might convince the French 
officials that independence is the only wish of the Algerian people.
Second, the high cost in lives as well as in money, and recent 
violent riots of the non-communist left-wing groups who favor negotiated
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peace in Algeria may ease the French policy in dealing with the 
nationalists.
Third, John F. Kennedy, the President, has indicated several times
that Algeria should have its independence and that the United States
should support this position. In 1957, he declared that the delegation
of the United States to the United Nations should not support France in
the General Assembly on Algerian problem.Although the President
showed sympathy for the Algerians cause, he did not offer a positive
plan for obtaining Algerian independence. The Congressional limitations
of his power to conduct foreign policy must also be considered.
Fourth, the firm offer of Red volunteers (as described by Peking
and Moscow), to help the Algerians fight the French might change the
French policy in dealing with the rebels.
A final important change which might lead to a settlement of the
Algerian problem is the new course of President de Gaulle. The French
President is taking a firm new course to end the six year old war in
Algeria. He declared in his speech of November 4, I960, that:
This course leads not to an Algeria governed by Metropolitan 
France, but to an Algerian Algeria. This means an emancipated 
Algeria, an Algeria in lAich the Algerians themselves will 
decide their destiny, an Algeria in which the responsibilities 
will be in the hands of the Algerians, an Algeria which, if 
the Algerians so desired— and I think this is the case— wül 
have her own Government, her institutions and her laws, [lî 
the new Algeria chose to break with us/" we would certainly 
not persist in remaining by force alongside people who would 
reject us ...
^^^Kennedy, Loc. cit., 17.
^^^The text of de Gaulle’s speech on the Algerian question. New 
York Times, (5 November I960), 2.
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The main points of the new policy of President de Gaulle have
been summarized as follows :
(1) De Gaulle would unilaterally declare a truce; (2) he 
would negotiate with the FLN on ending the war and organizing 
elections;; (3) he would hold a referendum on his policy 
in both France and Algeria; (4) he would create an Algerian 
government with or without the FLN.^^
In order to put through his decision in Algeria, and to face the 
threat of some army officers that they will revolt if Algeria is lost, 
de Gaulle declared that he would hold a popular referendum. Moreover, 
if the ultras stand in his way, he threatened to dissolve the Parliament 
and, if necessary, assume the dictatorial powers provided him by Article 
16 of his Constitution.
30.
Algeria Aflame. " Newsweek. LVI, (21 November I960), 44.
243"France: Old Man, New Course," Time, LXXVI, (14 November I960),
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CONCLUSIONS
case studies have been briefly examined in this paper to show 
the role of the United Nations in assisting two emerging nations to 
obtain their independence. While the United Nations played an invalu­
able role in solving the Indonesia question, it failed to play a 
similar role in dealing with the Algerian problem.
The Security Council was informed of hostilities in Indonesia 
between the Dutch and the two year old Republic of Indonesia on
30 July 1947. Within two days the Security Council placed the question
on its agenda and adopted a resolution (1 August 19^7) which asked the 
parties to cease hostilities, to resort to negotations or any other 
peaceful means to solve their problem, and to keep the Security Council 
informed about the progress of the settlement. Three days later both 
parties accepted the terms of the resolution.
When hostilities broke again shortly after the acceptance of the 
Security Council's resolution, the Security Council adopted other 
resolutions to assist the parties in a settlement of the problem. The
Security Council also tendered its mediation through the Committee of
Good Offices. This Committee brought about the Renville Truce Agree­
ment in January 1948, Steps toward a final solution between the 
parties reached a standstill in that year. In December, the Dutch 
violated the Truce Agreement and renewed military attacks on the 
Republic. The Security Council adopted a series of resolutions 
requesting an effective cease-fire, a release of the Indonesian 
political prisoners held by the Dutch, and the establishment of a
117
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sovereign State of Indonesia to be agreed to by Republican and Dutch 
representatives. In January 19^9i the Security Council converted the 
Committee of Good Offices into the United Nations Commission for 
Indonesia and gave it more authority and responsibility. The United 
Nations Commission played an invaluable role in assisting the parties 
to reach a lasting agreement at the Round-Table Conference at the Hague.
In retrospect several factors aided the United Nations in assist­
ing the parties to reach a settlement. First, the Netherlands was not 
a permanent member of the Security Council, and was unable by itself 
to prevent the Security Council from placing the question on its 
agenda or from passing resolutions which the Netherlands did not 
approve. Second, the major western powers were not allied closely 
enough with the Netherlands to veto Security Council’s resolutions 
which the Dutch did not approve. Third, the United States, with its 
power in the Security Council, played a major role in helping the 
Republic of Indonesia obtain her independence. Furthermore, neither 
Britain nor France strongly opposed the Security Council's actions. 
Fourth, the United Nations from the very beginning of the dispute did 
not allow itself to become preoccupied with legal subtleties, but 
rather put its emphasis on more definitive issues. For example, 
neither the competence of the United Nations to deal in.th the dispute, 
nor the Article of the Charter under which the Security Council should 
handle the dispute was discussed in the United Nations. Instead, the 
discussion centered around such objectives as a cessation of hostilities 
and a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Fifth, the Super-Powers 
agreed that the United Nations should play a role in settling the
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problem. Without such an agreement the United Nations would not have 
operated as successfully as it did. Sixth, the change in the Dutch 
cabinet (in 1948) from conservative to Liberal Socialist, who were 
capable of mustering strong support in the Netherlands* parliament and 
were willing to negotiate with the Indonesian Republic and to co­
operate with the United Nations in order to end the deadlock, was a 
major factor that assisted the United Nations in playing a vital role 
in its attempt to settle the conflict.
The Security Council, in contrast, refused to place the Algerian 
question on its agenda, on the ground that it was a French domestic 
issue. Only Iran and the Soviet Union voted in favor of placing the 
item on the agenda. China and Yugoslavia abstained, and the other 
seven members of the Security Council, (including the United States 
and the United Kingdom,) voted against inclusion of the question.
While the Algerian question received more detailed consideration 
in the General Assembly during the five years in which the Algerian 
question was placed on its agenda, no resolution similar to the 
Indonesian resolution of 1 August 194-7. or any other resolution of real 
importance was passed.
The General Assembly, at its eleventh session, adopted a resolu­
tion ^ich simply expressed its hope for a suitable settlement in 
conformity "with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The General Assembly, at its twelfth session, adopted a second 
resolution in which it expressed the hope for a just and peaceful 
solution for the Algerian problem. These were the only two resolu­
tions adopted by the United Nations with regard to the Algerian
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question.
The General Assembly did not adopt stronger resolutions for 
several reasons: 1. Only such resolutions could command the two- 
thirds vote required for passage of any resolution. 2. The majority of 
the members of the United Nations were afraid of jeopardizing any 
attenpts by the parties to obtain a solution outside the United 
Nations. 3* The refusal of the French delegation to participate in 
the debate made it difficult for the General Assembly to deal with 
the problem successfully.
Examination of the action of the United Nations in both cases 
leads one to believe that while the United Nations played an invaluable 
role in settling the Indonesian question, it failed to ameliorate the 
Algerian problem. However, this conclusion would do injustice to the 
international organization as a conciliatory agency, and it would 
tend to oversimplify the peculiar and the complex nature of the 
Algerian problem.
The Algerian problem, unlike the Indonesian question, is not an 
ordinary colonial issue. Algeria, unlike Indonesia which was a Dutch 
colony, is considered by many western countries as an integral part of 
Metropolitan France and not as a colony. This point raises several 
legal issues upon which no general agreement has been reached in the 
United Nations. The United Nations is thus forced to discuss at 
length the legal issues surrounding the Algerian problem. This deters 
the United Nations from taking prompt action, as it did in the 
Indonesian question.
While the delegations of France, Belgium, Colombia, the United
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Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, the majority 
of the other Western Powers and the majority of the Latin American 
states declared that Algeria was a part of Metropolitan France under 
the French constitution, the Afro-Asian bloc never accepted this view. 
This bloc argued that no matter what constitutional or political 
devices were used by France to justify the incorporation of Algeria, 
Algeria was not a part of a genuine union with France as long as the 
Algerians did not have political, social, economic and educational 
equality with the citizens of Metropolitan France or the "colons."
This issue led to another complex legal problem linked to the 
first one— namely whether or not Article 2, (7), of the Charter of the 
United Nations (which prohibits the United Nations to deal with matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state) 
is applicable to this situation, and whether or not the United Nations 
is competent to deal with the Algerian problem. France, and the states 
which supported he]) based their views on the argument that Algeria is 
an integral part of France. They believe that Article 2, (?) is 
applicable, and that the United Nations is not competent to deal with 
the question.
The Afro-Asian bloc and the Soviet bloc declared that Article 2, 
(7), of the Charter was not applicable in this situation, and that the 
United Nations had the right and the duty to deal with the question. 
Those who took this position backed their views by several arguments. 
First, that the inclusion of the item £>n the agenda might lead to a 
recommendation to both parties to reach a peaceful settlement. This, 
they believed, would amount neither to intervention in French domestic
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affairs, nor a punitive action. Second, the Afro-Asian bloc declared 
that the Algerian question no longer lies exclusively within the 
French jurisdiction as long as other countries are involved in the 
dispute. They referred to the deterioration of relations between 
France and of the Arab countries, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. 
This bloc believed that the United Nations is competent to deal with 
the problem under Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations.
This Article States:
The general Assembly may recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, 
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations among nations, including situations resulting from 
violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting 
forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
Finally, the argument continues. Article 2, (7), is not paramount
and has no priority over Article 14 of the Charter or over the
principles of self-determination. They demand, therefore, that the
United Nations take a strong action to help solve the problem.
Beside the legal issues there are several other problems which
make the Algerian problem much more difficult to solve than the
Indonesian question. The French domestic problems hamper United
Nations action. The French are divided among themselves over the
Algerian problem. Their views on this problem range from outright
assistance to the nationalists, to the defense of the French Array
views and Trench Algeria.” The communists, the socialist, the de
Gaullists and many well-known spokesmen for the intellegentsia support
an "Algerian Algeria." The European settlers, the French Army and
those who have special interests in Algeria demand "an all-out war,"
in Algeria to keep it French. All these different groups have great
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influence on the French policy in Algeria.
The European settlers are against negotiating with the FLN because 
they are afraid that such a step might reduce their influence and 
power in Algeria, which they consider their homeland. The recent 
discovery of oil and mineral resources in Algeria adds to the com­
plexity of the problem. The European settlers and the French investors 
believe that they will lose their investments if the FLN takes over. 
Therefore, they increase the pressure against negotiations with the 
nationalists, for negotiations might lead to the increase of the power 
of the FLN.
The Airniy also has a vested interest in Algeria. The French defeat 
in World War II, the loss of Syria, Indochina, particularly the defeat 
of the French paratroopers in the Dienbienphu battle, Morocco, Tunisia 
and the long war in Algeria frustrated the French Army and made it 
bitterly against negotating with the FLN. Such a step is considered a 
defeat for the Army. Thus, the Algerian problem was further compli­
cated by the Army's position with regards to. the problem. The Army's 
threat to take over the government made many delegations in the United 
Nations more cautious and reluctant to help pass any strong resolutions 
by the United Nations.
In addition to the legal issues and the French domestic problems, 
which made it very difficult for the United Nations to act as it did 
in the Indonesian question, was the position taken by the super powers. 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the 
United Nations should play a role in solving the Indonesian question, 
the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, did not support United
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Nations intervention in the Algerian problem. The Soviet Union 
declared that the United Nations should recognize the self- 
determination of the Algerian people and should request the parties 
to resort to negotiations and cease hostilities. The United States 
considered the Algerian problem as a French domestic affair; therefore, 
according to Article 2,(7), the United Nations was not competent to 
deal with the question. The only change in the policy of the United 
States with regard to the Algerian problem came about in the fourteenth 
session of the General Assembly when the United States delegation 
abstained from voting on an Afro-Asian resolution which would have 
had the United Nations urge the parties to enter into negotiation and 
cease hostilities.
It is necessary to note that in the Indonesian question the United 
Kingdom supported the important resolutions made by the Security 
Council to end the deadlock, although she did not recognize the 
competence of the United Nations to deal with the question. She also 
forbade the selling of war materials to the Netherlands for use in 
Indonesia. However the position of the United Kingdom with regard to 
the Algerian problem, as we have seen, differs greatly from the 
position she took towards Indonesia. This fact is bound to have 
influence on the United States policy towards the Algerian problem 
because of the close ties between United Kingdom and America. These 
ties cause the United States to take into consideration the course of 
the United Kingdom in deciding her own position.
In the fifteenth session of the General Assembly the United 
States did not support the Afro-Asian resolution which would have the
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United Nations supervise a referendum in Algeria to determine vôiether 
or not the Algerian people desire independence. The United States in 
the same session abstained from voting on a referendum to end 
colonialism. This indicates that the future policy of the United 
States wiiii regards to the Algerian problem is still uncertain.
In speaking about the role of the United Nations in assisting in 
solving any problem, it is essential to note that the United Nations 
is merely an instrument in the hands of its member nations. What 
can be accomplished by this instrument and how it is done depends 
largely upon the policies of the members, and particularly upon the 
policies of the major powers. Thus, the United Nations, as an 
independent organization, could not determine the success of its role 
in the Indonesia question; rather this success was determined by the 
willingness of the parties involved and the major powers to allow the 
United Nations to have a role in settling the question, as well as 
other circumstances outside of the influence of the United Nations,
Similarly, it is neither the United Nations nor its Charter which 
prevents stronger action in the Algerian problem by the United Nations; 
but rather it is the conflicting policies of the major powers which 
are responsible for this ineffective action.
In conclusion, the following conditions could greatly aid the 
United Nations to play a more vital role in assisting parties to 
disputes, as in Algeria and Indonesia to solve their problem; 1. If 
the super-powers agree to give the United Nations opportunity to take 
action; 2. If both parties to a dispute agree to co-operate with the 
United Nations in its attempt to settle the dispute; 3* If the colonial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
powers do not have dories tic problems x:hich prevent then fro:' oetvli ■ 
tilt, dispute peacefully. Such domestic problems erd.stea \
Netherlands before the formation of the Liberal Socialist Cabinet in 
August 1948, and no'xr they eolst in France; 4. If the coloT'ial pC' ‘ 
not a permanent member of the Security Council.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION
1 August 1947^^°
The Security Council>
Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed 
forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia,
Calls upon the parties
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) To settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful 
means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress 
of the settlement.
2
26 August 1947^̂ ^
I. The Security Council
1. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply 
with the resolution of 1 August 1947,
2. Notes ;d.th satisfaction the statement issued by the Netherlands 
Government on 11 August, in which it affirms its intention to organize 
a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with 
the purposes of the Linggadjati Agreement,
3. Notes that the Netherlands Government intends immediately to 
request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on 
the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia,
4. Notes that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has 
requested appointment by the Security Council of a commission of
^^^O.R.S.C.. Second Year, No.68 and Un. Document S/459, 1 August
1947.
^̂ '̂ O.R.S.C.. Second Year, Nos.83 and 84 and Ü.N. Document S/525, 
26 August 1947.
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observers,
5. Request the Governments members of the Council who have career 
consular representatives in Batavia to instruct them to prepare 
jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council 
reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following tlie 
resolution of the Council of 1 August 19̂ 7» such reports to cover the 
observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in 
areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in 
occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties,
6. Requests the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic 
of Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to in paiagrapr, 
5, all facilities necessary for the effective fulfillment of their 
mission,
7. Resolve to consider the matter further should the situation 
require.
II. The Security Council,
Resolve to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist 
in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with 
paragraph (b) of the resolution of the Council of 1 August 194-7. The 
Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist 
in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of 
three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third 
to be designated by the two so selected.
3
1 November 194-7̂ ®̂
The Security Council.
Having received and taken note of the report of the Consular 
Commission dated 14- October 194-7, indicating that the Council's résolu- 
tion of 1 August 194-7, relating to the cessation of hostilities has 
not been fully effective;
Having taken note that, according to the Report, no attempt was made 
by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means 
of giving effect to that resolution;
^ ^ O.R.S.C., Second Year, No.103 and U:.N. Document S/597, 
3 November 194-7.
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Calls upon the parties concerned forthid_th to consult with each 
other,“either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices, as to 
the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire 
resolution, and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or 
incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and to 
take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property;
Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in 
reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance 
of the cease-fire resolution;
Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military 
assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good 
Offices;
Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices, and 
the Consular Commission that its resolution of 1 August should be 
interpreted as meaning that the use of the armed forces of either 
party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not 
occupied by it on 4 August 1947, is inconsistent with the Council 
resolution of 1 August.
Should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, 
invites the parties to conclude between them as soon as possible the 
agreements referred to in its resolution of 25 August 194?.
4
24 December 1948^^9
The Security Council.
Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia, am;
Having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices.;
Calls upon the parties
(a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and
(b) immediately to release the President and other political 
prisoners arrested since 18 December.
Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security 
Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have 
transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948; and to observe an
^ O.R.S.C.. Third Year, No. 134 and U.N. Document S/ll50, 
24 December 1948.
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report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs(2) and (b) above.  ̂ ^
5
28 January 1949^50
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions of 1 August 1947, 25 August 194?, and 
1 November 194?, with respect to the Indonesian Question:
Taking note vrith approval of the Reports submitted to the Security 
Council by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;
Considering that its resolutions of 24 December 1948 and 28 December 
1948 have not been fully carried out;
Considering that continued occupation of the territory of the 
Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is 
incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties 
and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the 
Indonesia dispute;
Considering that the establishment and maintenance of law and order 
throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of 
the expressed objectives and desires of both parties;
Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the 
principles of the Renville Agreement and agree that free and democratic 
elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of 
establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date, 
and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for the 
observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United 
Nations; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed 
his government’s desire to have such elections held not later than 
1 October 1949;
Noting also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands 
plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by 
1 January 1950, if possible, and, in any case, during the year 1950»
Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims 
and position of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force;
^^^O.R.S.C.. Fourth Year, No.9 and U.N. Document S/l254, 28 January
1949.
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1. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to insure the 
immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the 
Government of the Republic simultaneously to order its amed adJierents 
to cease guerrilla warfare, and calls upon both parties to co-operate 
in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order 
throughout the area affected.
2. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immedi­
ately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them 
since 1? December 1948 in the Republic of Indonesia; and to facilitate 
the immediate return of officials of the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their 
responsibilities under paragraph 1 above and in order to exercise 
their appropriate functions in full freedom, including adminstration 
of the Jogjakarta area, which shall include the city of Jogjakarta and 
its immediate environs. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may 
reasonably be required by that Government for its effective function 
in the Jogjakarta area and for communication and consultation with all 
persons in Indonesia.
3. Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed 
objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal, 
independent, and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest 
possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by repre­
sentatives of the Government of the Netherlands and representative of 
the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the Commission 
referred to in paragraph 4 below on the basis of the principles set 
forth in the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, and taking advantage 
of the extent of agreement reached between the parties regarding the 
proposals submitted to them by the United States representative on the 
Committee of Good Offices on 10 September 1948; and in particular, on 
the basis that:
(a) The establishment of the Interim Federal Government which is 
to be granted the powers of internal government in Indonesia 
during the interim period before the transfer of sovereignty shall 
be the result of the above negotiations and shall take place not 
later than 15 March 1949;
(b) The elections which are to be held for the purpose uf 
choosing representatives to an Indonesian Constituent Assembly 
should be completed by 1 October 1949 ; and
(c) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government 
of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia should take 
place at the earliest possible date and in any case not later 
than 1 July 1950î
Provided that if no agreement is reached by one month prior to the 
respective dates referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) 
above, the Commission referred to in paragraph 4 (a) below or sue
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other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance ifith 
paragraph 4 (c) below, shall immediately report to the Security Council 
with its recommendations for solution of the difficulties.
4. (a) The Committee of Good Offices shall henceforth be known as the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act 
as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia and 
shall have all of the functions assigned to the Committee of Good 
Offices by the Security Council since 18 December, and the 
functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution. The 
Commission shall act by majority vote, but its reports and recom­
mendations to the Security Council shall present both majority and 
minority views if there is a difference of opinion among the 
members of the Commission.
(b) The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work 
of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia by providing 
military observers and other staff and facilitaties to enable the 
Commission to carry out its duties under the Council’s resolutions 
of 2̂  and 28 December 1948 as well as under the present resolu­
tion, and shall temporarily suspend other activities.
(c) The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation 
of this resolution, and shall assist the parties in the negotia­
tions to be undertaken under paragraph 3 above and is authorized 
to make recommendations to them or to the Security Council on 
matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in 
such negotiations the Commission shall make recommendations to 
the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and functions of 
the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to 
assist in the implementation of the Provisions of such agreement 
until sovereignty is transferred by the Government of the 
Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.
(d) The commission shall have authority to consult with repre­
sentatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and to 
invite representatives of such areas to participate in the 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above.
(3) The Commission or such other United Nations agency as may be 
established in accordance ivith its recommendation under paragraph 
4 (c) above is authorized to observe on behalf of the United 
Nations the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and is 
further authorized, in respect of the Territories of Java, Madura 
and Sumatra, to make recommendations regarding the conditions 
necessary (a) to ensure that the elections are free and 
democratic, and (b) to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and 
publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not 
construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.
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(f) The Commission should assist in achieving the earliest 
possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic.
To this and it shall, after consultation ’i-ri.th the parties, recom- 
mand the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements 
of public security and the protection of life and property, areas 
controlled by the Republic under the Renville Agreement (outside 
of the Jogjakarta area) should be progressively returned to the 
administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 
and shall supervise such transfers. The recommendations of the 
Commission may include provision for such economic measures as 
are required for the proper functioning of the administration and 
for the economic well-being of the population of the areas 
involved in such transfers. The Commission shall, after con­
sultation with the parties, recommend which if any Netherlands 
forces shall be retained temporarily in any area (outside the 
Jogjakarta area) in order to assist in the maintenance of law and 
order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommenda­
tions of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commis­
sion shall report immediately to the Security Council with its 
further recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.
(g) The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council, 
and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary.
(h) The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and 
other persons as it deems necessary.
5. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission 
such staff, funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission 
for the discharge of its function.
6. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Indonesia to co-operate fully in giving effect to the provisions of 
this resolution.
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APPENDIX B
RESOLUTIONS PASSED AND FAILED TO PASS IN THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ALGERIAN QUESTION
I. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 909 (X)251 
TENTH SESSION 1955 
THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA
The General Assembly,
Decides not to consider further the item entitled "The Question of 
Algeria" and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda 
of its tenth session.
RESOLUTION 1012 (Xl)^52 
ELEVENTH SESSION 1956 
THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA
The General Assembly.
Having heard the statements made by various delegations and discussed 
the question of Algeria,
Having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing much 
suffering and loss of human lives.
Expresses the hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, 
democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, 
in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
25I0.R.G.A., Tenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 548th Meeting,
(25 November 1955)* 371»
^^^O.R.G.A.. Eleventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 62, Doc.A/Res/ 
463, (15 February 1957), 5-
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RESOLUTION 1184 (XII)253 
TWELFTH SESSION 1957 
THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA
The General Assembly,
Having discussed the question of Algeria,
Recalling its resolution 1012 (XI) of 15 February 195?,
1. Expresses again its concern over the situation in Algeria;
2. Takes note of the offer of good offices made by His Majesty the 
King of Morocco and His Excellency the President of the Republic of 
Tunisia;
3. Expresses the wish that, in a spirit of effective co-operation, 
pourparlers will be entered into, and other appropriate means utilized, 
with a view to a solution, in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
II. RESOLUTIONS REJECTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4
13 December 1958^^4
The General Assembly.
Having discussed the question of Algeria,
Recalling its resolution 1012 (XI) of 15 February 1957. by which 
the General Assembly expressed the hope that a peaceful, democratic 
and just solution would be found through appropriate means, in 
conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling further its resolution 1184 (XII) of 10 December 1957. by 
which the General Assembly express that pourparlers would be entered 
into, and other appropriate means utilized, with a view to a solution 
in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the
^^^o .r .g .A,, Twelfth Session, Aniieies, Agenda Item 59, Doc. 
,1184 (XII)'(10 December 1957). 3-
^^^O.R.G.A., Thirteen#':Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 63, Doc. 
A/C.l/L. 232.
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United Nations,
Recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence,
Deeply concerned with the continuance of war in Algeria,
Considering that the present situation in Algeria constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security.
Urges negotiations between the parties concerned with a view to 
reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations.
5
12 December 1959*
The General Assembly,
Having discussed the question of Algeria,
Recalling its two previous resolutions on Algeria,
Recall Article 1 (2) of the Charter,
Expresses deep concern with the continuance hostilities in Algeria,
(1) Recognize the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, 
and
(2) Urge the holding of pourparlers with a view to arriving at a 
peaceful solution on the basis of the right of self-determination, in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter.255
♦Because of the unavailibility of all the documents in the 
library pertinent to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, 
this resolution is not a true copy of the original text.
^55Yearbook of the United Nations. 1959; New York: Columbia 
University Press in co-operation with the United Nations, (I960), 55«
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